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TAXATION
JAMES SERVEN*
During 1991,1 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals demonstrated
that the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 ("the Code") is in fact a "mirror
of life,"'2 as the court decided cases involving a wide array of personal
and business experiences and transactions, ranging from oil drilling in
Wyoming to drug running in Belize, and from timeshare units in Park
City, Utah, to retail malls in Concordia, Kansas. Many of these were
cases of first impression in the circuit, and one case3 addressed an issue
of first impression in the federal courts. The Tenth Circuit's approach
to resolving these controversies is instructive to anyone with an interest
in federal tax matters.
Some of the cases decided by the Tenth Circuit in 1991 resolved tax
liabilities dating back to the late 1970's and very early 1980's, and in-
volved the application of "old law." Aside from the obvious commen-
tary these cases provide as to the speed with which the Internal Revenue
Service ("the IRS") and our judicial system process tax controversies,
the cases are a reminder that the Code has undergone a terrifying de-
gree of revision in the interim.4 The flood of tax legislation that charac-
terized the 1980's prompted one commentator to describe the Tax
Reform Act of 1986 as "the latest in a series of attacks of tax legislative
diarrhea that seem to strike the American people, like swine flu or Tai-
wan Flu, about every sixteen to eighteen months." 5 Where appropriate,
* B.S.B.A., Accounting, University of Denver, 1977; Masters in Taxation, Univer-
sity of Denver, 1978; J.D., Stanford University, 1981.
1. This Note examines cases decided by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals during
1991 in the area of federal income, estate and gift taxation.
2. SeeJAMEsJ. FREELAND ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 1 (6th
ed. 1987) ("There is no such thing as pure tax law. Instead, tax principles relate to events
and transactions that would go on even if there were no federal income tax .....
3. Schroeder v. United States, 924 F.2d 1547 (10th Cir. 1991).
4. In the 1980's, the Code has been amended by, inter alia, the Economic Recovery
Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (1981); the Tax Equity and Fiscal Re-
sponsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324 (1982); the Subchapter S Revi-
sion Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-354, 96 Stat. 1669 (1982); the Tax Reform Act of 1984
(Division A of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984), Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494 (1984);
the Retirement Equity Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-397, 98 Stat. 1426 (1984); the Tax
Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986); the Revenue Act of 1987
(Title X of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987), Pub. L. No. 100-203, 101
Stat. 1330 (1987); the Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-
647, 102 Stat. 3342 (1988); the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1989 (Title VII of the Om-
nibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989); Pub. L. No. 101-239, 103 Stat. 2106 (1989); and
the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1990 (Title XI of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1990), Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388 (1990). The year 1991 passed without
the enactment of any major federal tax legislation.
5. Charles 0. Galvin, Tax Refom: What? Again? A Rose by any Other Nam..... in 39
MAJOR TAX PLANNING 1200, at 12-1 (1987).
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this Note will point out where the relevant provisions of the Code may
have been amended, and how the issue might be treated today.
I. APPLICATION OF THE STEP TRANSACTION DOCTRINE TO RECAST
PURPORTED REORGANIZATION INTO PARENT-SUBSIDIARY
LIQUIDATION: ASSOCIATED WHOLESALE GROCERS,
INC V. UNITED STATES 6
A. Background
The gross income of a taxpayer includes all gains and losses derived
from dealings in property. 7 Gain from the sale or other disposition of
property is computed as the excess of the amount realized therefrom
over the adjusted basis of the property, and loss is calculated as the ex-
cess of the adjusted basis over the amount realized. 8 As a general rule,
the entire amount of gain or loss realized upon the sale or exchange of
property must be recognized unless otherwise specifically provided in
the Code.9
Corporate liquidations are not immune from this general rule, and
the amount received' ° by a shareholder as a liquidating distribution
from a corporation is treated as made in full payment in exchange for
the shareholder's stock." However, under an important exception to
this rule, no gain or loss is recognized on the receipt by a parent corpo-
ration of property distributed in complete liquidation of a subsidiary
corporation,' 2 provided that certain requirements' s are satisfied.'
4
Upon receipt of the property distributed by the subsidiary, the parent
will take a "carryover" basis in such property, that is, a basis which is the
same as it was in the hands of the subsidiary. 15
6. 927 F.2d 1517 (10th Cir. 1991).
7. I.R.C. § 61(a)(3) (1988).
8. Id. § 1001(a).
9. Id § 1001(c).
10. The amount received is generally measured by the amount of money and the fair
market value of other property received in the liquidation. Idt § 1001(b).
11. Id. § 331.
12. Id. § 332(a).
13. The requirements of I.R.C. § 332(b) include: (1) the corporation receiving the
property was, on the date of the adoption of the plan of liquidation, and has continued to
be at all times until the receipt of the property, the owner of stock in such other corpora-
tion meeting the requirements of I.R.C. § 1504(a)(2) (that is, the ownership consists of at
least 80% of the total voting power of the stock of the other corporation, and has a value
equal to at least 80% of the total value of the stock of such other corporation); and either
(2) the distribution is by such other corporation in complete cancellation or redemption
of all its stock, and the transfer of all the property occurs within the taxable year, or (3) the
distribution is one of a series of distributions by the other corporation in complete cancel-
lation or redemption of all its stock in accordance with a plan of liquidation under which
the transfer of all the property is to be completed within three years from the close of the
taxable year during which is made the first of the series of distributions under the plan.
14. The transactions at issue in Associated Wholesale Grocers occurred in 1980, under a
slightly different version of I.R.C. § 332(b). The stated requirements were revised by the
Tax Reform Act of 1986, but only to cross-reference the more specific rules of I.R.C.
§ 1504(a)(2) in the first of the three requirements noted above.
15. I.R.C. § 334(b) (1988). The carry-over basis rule applies only to the parent meet-
ing the 80% stock ownership test described supra note 13. Although Associated Wholesale
1038 [Vol. 69:4
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Absent the provisions of I.R.C. § 332, gain or loss would be recog-
nized by a parent corporation upon the liquidation of its subsidiary 16 as
the difference between the fair market value of the assets received and
the parent's basis in its stock of the subsidiary.1 7 The fact that I.R.C.
§ 332 acts to disallow losses as well as to shield gains makes it a double-
edged sword that can lead to harsh results. For example, assume parent
PQR purchased all the outstanding stock of subsidiary STU five years
ago for $500,000. STU's only asset was a parcel of vacant land worth
$500,000, in which STU had a basis of $250,000. If the land, and there-
fore STU's stock, is today worth only $400,000, I.R.C. § 332 would deny
recognition of PQR's $100,000 economic loss upon a complete liquida-
tion of the subsidiary. Moreover, PQR would take a carryover basis of
$250,000 in the land, and would recognize a gain of $250,000 if it then
sold the land for its $400,000 fair market value, despite the fact that,
overall, PQR has suffered a $100,000 economic loss over the course of
the transaction.
On the other hand, if PQR simply sold its STU stock for $400,000,
the $100,000 loss-measured by the difference between the sale pro-
ceeds and PQR's $500,000 basis in the STU stock-could be properly
Grocers related to a 1980 transaction, and thus was determined under provisions of I.R.C.
§ 334(b) in effect prior to the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, the Tax
Reform Act of 1986 and the Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988; the
amendments made to I.R.C. § 334(b) by those tax bills would not today affect Super Mar-
ket Developers's calculation of its basis in the stock received from its subsidiary. This is
particularly true because Associated Wholesale Grocers acquired the Weston Investment
stock by tender offer in 1976, some four years prior to the transaction at issue. If the
acquisition had occurred within two years of the adoption of a plan of liquidation, the
taxpayers could have taken advantage of the prior version of I.R.C. § 332(b)(2), which
codified the principle of Kimball-Diamond Milling Co. v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 74
(1950), aff'd per curiam, 187 F.2d 718 (5th Cir. 1951). That case provided that when a
parent acquires a subsidiary and within two years adopts a plan of complete liquidation of
the subsidiary, the parent's basis in the subsidiary's assets will be determined by reference
to the parent's basis in the stock of the subsidiary, and will not be carried over from the
subsidiary. The prior provisions of I.R.C. § 332(b)(2) were repealed by the Tax Equity
and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, and were replaced by the elective provisions of
I.R.C. § 338. See Kansas Sand & Concrete, Inc. v. Commissioner, 462 F.2d 805 (10th Cir.
1972) (Where merger of subsidiary into parent fell under the literal terms of both the tax-
free reorganization provisions of I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(A) and the liquidation provisions that
included prior I.R.C. § 334(b)(2), the latter took precedence and parent was required to
use its basis in the subsidiary stock to determine its basis in assets received from the sub-
sidiary, rather than use a carryover basis from the subsidiary.).
16. A related issue concerns the recognition of gain or loss by the subsidiary upon the
distribution of its assets in complete liquidation. The transaction which was the subject of
Associated Wholesale Grocers occurred prior to the repeal of prior I.R.C. § 337, which pro-
vided that no gain or loss was recognized by liquidating corporations that adopted so-
called "12-month plans of liquidation." Today, I.R.C. § 336(a) requires a corporation to
recognize gain or loss on the distribution of its property in complete liquidation, as if the
property were sold to the distributee at its fair market value. However, Weston Invest-
ments would today be protected by the current version of I.R.C. § 337(a), which provides
that no gain or loss is recognized by the liquidating corporation on the distribution with
respect to property distributed to an 80%o shareholder in a complete liquidation to which
I.R.C. § 332 applies. Gain (but not loss) will be recognized on property distributed to
minority shareholders. I.R.C. § 336(d)(3) (1988).
17. The loss disallowance rules of I.R.C. § 267 do not apply to corporate liquidations
either in 1980 or today. Id § 267(a)(1).
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claimed. 18 For this reason, parent-subsidiary taxpayers occasionally find
themselves in the position of desiring to avoid the operation of I.R.C.
§ 332 when a complete liquidation of the subsidiary would otherwise
yield a loss. 19 This might occur, for example, if STU owned many par-
cels of land, and the goals of PQR were to terminate the corporate exist-
ence of STU, dispose of some of the STU assets and cause the
remainder of the STU assets to be owned outright by PQR. Such was
the dilemma of the taxpayers in Associated Wholesale Grocers.
B. Facts
In 1980, Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc. ("Associated Whole-
sale Grocers") owned all the capital stock of Super Market Developers,
Inc. ("Super Market Developers"), which in turn owned approximately
99.97% of the total outstanding shares of Weston Investment Co.
("Weston Investment"). Weston Investment was a publicly-traded hold-
ing company that owned a number of corporate supermarkets. During
1980, Associated Wholesale Grocers decided to discontinue allowing
Super Market Developers to own and operate grocery stores through
subsidiaries such as Weston Investment.
Super Market Developers could have caused Weston Investment to
be liquidated, thus enabling all Weston Investment's grocery stores to
be owned outright by Super Market Developers. Unfortunately, Super
Market Developers had paid $11,727,716 for the Weston Investment
stock, whereas Weston Investment's basis in its assets was apparently
only $9,374,458 and the apparent fair market value of the Weston In-
vestment assets was approximately $9,349,703.20 If Super Market De-
velopers was to wind up owning outright the grocery stores and other
assets owned by Weston Investment, a complete liquidation of Weston
Investment would have fallen within the rules of I.R.C. §§ 332 and 334,
so that no loss would be recognized by Super Market Developers, and it
would take a carry-over basis of $9,374,458 in Weston Investment's as-
sets. The difference between the fair market value of Weston Invest-
ment's assets and the $11,727,716 that Super Market Developers had
paid for the Weston Investment stock, otherwise recognizable as a loss
in the absence of I.R.C. § 332, could not be claimed as such.
18. Ia § 1001.
19. The loss arises by virtue of I.R.C. §§ 331(a), 1001(a) and 1001(c).
20. The opinions of both the district court and the Tenth Circuit are somewhat con-
fusing on this issue. The Tenth Circuit identified the $9,374,458 as "the carryover basis
representing the market value of Weston's assets," Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc. v.
United States, 927 F.2d 1517, 1518 n.1 (10th Cir. 1991), but this statement is a non sequitur.
In fact, the figure apparently represented Weston Investment's basis in its underlying as-
sets. The district court states that Super Market Developers's basis in its Weston Invest-
ment stock was $11,727,716, and that the capital loss reported by the taxpayers was
$2,353,258, Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc. v. United States, 720 F. Supp. 887, 888
(D. Kan. 1989), a result that can only be obtained by comparison to the $9,374,458 figure.
The latter figure is not mentioned at all in the district court's opinion, however, and it is




It so happened that Weston Investment itself owned various subsid-
iaries, one of which was Weston Market, Inc. ("Weston Market"). The
grocery store owned by Weston Market was managed by Thomas Elder,
who expressed an interest in buying Weston Market. Associated Whole-
sale Grocers, Super Market Developers and Weston Investment seized
upon Elder's interest in acquiring Weston Market as an opportunity to
recruit him in a transaction that would provide him with ownership of
Weston Market, transfer ownership of all the grocery stores directly to
Super Market Developers, and allow Associated Wholesale Grocers to
claim a capital loss in excess of $2 million on its consolidated federal
income tax return.
In December of 1980, a two-step transaction was consummated be-
tween Weston Investment, Super Market Developers and a newly-
formed corporation wholly owned by Elder called Elder Food Mart, Inc.
("Elder, Inc."). In the first step, Weston Investment was merged into
Elder, Inc., with Elder, Inc. as the surviving corporation. Rather than
exchanging Elder, Inc. stock in the merger, however, Elder, Inc. ex-
changed $300,000 in cash and a non-interest bearing demand promis-
sory note in the amount of $9,049,703 for the Weston Investment
stock.2 1 This consideration was distributed among the Weston Invest-
ment shareholders, with part of the cash earmarked to cash out Weston
Investment's minority shareholders.
In the second step, under a so-called "Agreement and Plan of Reor-
ganization" which took effect "immediately following the time of effec-
tiveness of the merger,"' 22 Super Market Developers bought back all the
assets acquired by Elder, Inc. under the merger agreement except for the
stock of Weston Market. In exchange for those assets, Super Market
Developers paid an amount equal to the principal amount of the promis-
sory note given by Elder, Inc. in the merger and now held by Super
Market Developers, plus an amount equal to the cash received by the
cashed-out minority shareholders.23 The net effect was that the
$9,049,703 represented by the promissory note simply became a
"wash," and Elder, Inc. had essentially paid $300,000, less the amounts
used to cash out Weston Investment's minority shareholders, to acquire
all the stock of Weston Market. For its part, Super Market Developers
was now the outright owner of all the grocery stores formerly owned by
Weston Investment, which had been merged out of existence, and had
essentially provided no consideration other than the cash used to cash
out Weston Investment's minority shareholders. Consistent with the
two-part nature of the transaction, Associated Wholesale Grocers and
Super Market Developers treated the merger aspect of the transaction as
21. Although technically a merger under state law, the transaction was apparently re-
ported as a taxable event by Associated Wholesale Grocers, presumably because the
merger did not satisfy (and most likely was specifically structured not to satisfy) thejudi-
cially-created "continuity of interest" test required to be met for the merger to qualify as a
tax-free reorganization under I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(A).
22. Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc., 927 F.2d at 1518-19.
23. lId at 1519.
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giving rise to a reportable loss of $2,353,258,24 and claimed that loss as
a long-term capital loss in their consolidated federal income tax return
for 1980.25
The merger-and-repurchase nature of the transaction as structured
was clearly aimed at circumventing I.R.C. § 332 and creating a tax loss
for Associated Wholesale Grocers and Super Market Developers on
their consolidated return. Predictably relying upon the well-known
"step transaction doctrine," the IRS denied Associated Wholesale Gro-
cers's capital loss. Associated Wholesale Grocers sued in district court
after its administrative claim for refund was denied. The district court
granted summary judgment for the government, 2 6 and the Tenth Cir-
cuit affirmed.
C. The Tenth Circuit's Opinion
Associated Wholesale Grocers presented the Tenth Circuit2 7 with an op-
portunity to consider the application of the step transaction doctrine to
corporate restructurings designed to avoid unwanted results under the
Code. Under the judicially-created step transaction doctrine, "a series
of formally separate steps may be amalgamated and treated as a single
transaction if they are in substance integrated, interdependent, and fo-
cused on a particular end result." 2 8 By thus "linking together all inter-
dependent steps with legal or business significance, rather than taking
them in isolation," federal tax liability may based "on a realistic view of
the entire transaction."
'2 9
From the time of Gregory v. Helvering,30 courts have consistently
strived to elevate substance over form in an attempt to weed out those
transactions which are a "mere device which put on the form of a [de-
sired corporate arrangement] as a disguise for concealing its real charac-
ter."3 1 The issue in Associated Wholesale Grocers, then, was whether the
form of the transaction was to prevail for federal income tax purposes, or
24. Again, the figures noted by the district court and the Tenth Circuit are difficult to
verify. See supra note 20.
25. The same end result could have been achieved by structuring the transaction as a
liquidation of Weston Investment, followed by a sale by Super Market Developers to Elder
of the stock of Weston Market now owned directly by Super Market Developers, for some-
thing less than $300,000. However, the liquidation transaction would not have given rise
to gain or loss under I.R.C. § 332, and Super Market Developers would have taken a carry-
over basis from Weston Investment in the Weston Investment assets. Super Market Devel-
opers would have thus owned those assets with both a basis and a fair market value of
approximately $9.3 million. The potential capital loss of over $2 million would have been
lost forever.
26. Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc. v. United States, 720 F. Supp. 887 (D. Kan.
1989).
27. The three-judge panel consisted of Judge Seymour, Judge Moore and Judge
Brorby.
28. 1 BORIS I. BrrrKER, FEDERAL TAXATioN OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GiFrs 4.3.5, at
4-48 (1981).
29. Id. at 4-52.
30. 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
31. Id. at 469.
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whether the substance of the transaction3 2 was to be recognized and given
effect. While recognizing that I.R.C. § 332 is not optional or elective,
and that a number of planning possibilities are evident which may allow
a corporation to avoid the application of that section,3 3 the Tenth Cir-
cuit noted that such planning possibilities are not immunized from step
transaction analysis.
8 4
After a brief review of the major Supreme Court decisions dealing
with the step transaction doctrine,3 5 the Tenth Circuit noted that courts
and commentators have identified three tests used in evaluating the step
transaction doctrine: the "end result" test, the "interdependence" test,
and the "binding commitment" test.3 6 Noting that the first two tests are
the most frequently applied,3 7 the court proceeded to summarize each.
Under the "end result" test, "purportedly separate transactions will
be amalgamated into a single transaction when it appears that they were
really component parts of a single transaction intended from the outset
to be taken for the purpose of reaching the ultimate result." s3 8 The "end
result" test thus resembles the substance over form principle, under
which "the end result of the series of interrelated steps controls the tax
consequences of the whole."'3 9 The "interdependence" test, on the
other hand, "focuses on the relationship between the steps, rather than
on the 'end result.' ",40 This test examines "whether on a reasonable
interpretation of objective facts the steps were so interdependent that
the legal relationships created by one transation would have been fruit-
32. The IRS claimed that the transaction constituted a parent-subsidiary liquidation
of Weston Investment by Super Market Developers, followed by a sale of the Weston Mar-
ket stock by Super Market Developers to Elder, Inc., with Super Market Developers contin-
uing to own all the other assets formerly held by Weston Investment.
33. See, e.g., 11 JACOB MERTENS, JR., THE LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 42.55,
at 142 (1990). For example, the parent can dispose of sufficient stock to fail the 80%
ownership test. Alternatively, the subsidiary might intentionally retain assets beyond the
periods specified in I.R.C. §§ 332(b)(2) and (3). Cf Rev. Rul. 77-150, 1977-1 C.B. 88.
34. Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc. v. United States, 927 F.2d 1517, 1525 (10th
Cir. 1991). The taxpayer in Associated Whole4ale Grocers had taken the position that the step
transaction doctrine simply does not apply to transactions under I.R.C. § 332. However,
the Tenth Circuit viewed the cases cited by the taxpayer as inapposite for this proposition.
35. Commissioner v. Clark, 489 U.S. 726, 738 (1989) (describing the step transaction
doctrine to mean "interrelated yet formally distinct steps in an integrated transaction may
not be considered independently of the overall transaction"); Minnesota Tea Co. v.
Helvering, 302 U.S. 609, 613 (1938) ("A given result at the end of a straight path is not
made a different result because reached by a devious path."); Gregory v. Helvering, 293
U.S. 465 (1935).
36. The "binding commitment" test was announced by the Supreme Court in Com-
missioner v. Gordon, 391 U.S. 83 (1968), but subsequent decisions have tended to limit
Gordon to its facts. Associated Wholesale Grocers, 927 F.2d at 1522 n.6.
37. The Tenth Circuit did not necessarily state that the "end result" and the "interde-
pendence" tests will be the only two tests that will be applied in the future, and it is possi-
ble that the Tenth Circuit might apply other formulations in appropriate circumstances.
38. Associated Wholesale Grocers, 927 F.2d at 1523 (quoting DAVID R. HERWrrz, BusINESS
PLANNING 804 (1966)).
39. Atchinson, Topeka & Santa Fe R.R. Co. v. United States, 443 F.2d 147, 151 (10th
Cir. 1971)). The individual tax significance of each step in the transaction is irrelevant if
the steps, when viewed as a whole, amount to a single taxable transaction. Crenshaw v.
United States, 450 F.2d 472, 475 (5th Cir. 1971).
40. Associated Wholesale Grocers, 927 F.2d at 1523.
1992] 1043
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less without completion of the series." 4 1 The Tenth Circuit then went
on to apply the "end result" and "interdependence" tests to the facts at
hand. If the Associated Wholesale Grocers transaction could be shown to fall
within the scope of either of the two tests, I.R.C. § 332 would apply and
the capital loss claimed by the taxpayers would be disallowed.
The Tenth Circuit first concluded that the "end result" test had no
application to I.R.C. § 332. On the authority of Granite Trust Co. v. United
States,4 2 the court concluded that I.R.C. § 332 is simply not an "end re-
suit" provision, but "'rather one which prescribes specific conditions
for the nonrecognition of realized gains or losses, conditions which, if
not strictly met, make the section inapplicable.' -43
The Tenth Circuit then turned its attention to the "interdepen-
dence" test. In evaluating this test, the court considered whether "the
steps were so interdependent that the legal relationships created by one
transaction would have been fruitless without a completion of the se-
ries." 44 Following a review of the documents utilized in the two-step
transaction,4 5 the court had little trouble concluding that the various
41. Randolph E. Paul & Philip Zimet, Step Transactions, in SELECTED STUDIES IN FED-
ERAL TAxATION 200, 254 (2d Series 1938).
42. 238 F.2d 670 (Ist Cir. 1956).
43. Associated Wholesale Grocers, 927 F.2d at 1524 (quoting Granite Trust Co., 238 F.2d at
675). Given that I.R.C. § 332 provides a road map by which taxpayers can structure sub-
sidiary liquidations to avoid gain or loss, finding the "end result" test to be inapplicable
seems entirely correct. Otherwise, as the Granite Trust court had concluded, "taxpayers
can, by taking appropriate steps, render [I.R.C. § 332] applicable or inapplicable as they
choose, rather than be at the mercy of the Commissioner on an 'end-result' theory." Gran-
ite Trust Co., 238 F.2d at 676. For example, if the "end result" test applied, a taxpayer
attempting a parent-subsidiary liquidation who failed to follow the requirements of I.R.C.
§ 332 could nevertheless argue that the transaction should be treated as if it had satisfied
these requirements because the "end result" of the liquidation otherwise fell within the
scope of that section. Such an "end result" argument becomes, in effect, an "end run"
argument, rendering the technical requirements of I.R.C. § 332 a nullity.
44. Paul & Zimet, supra note 41.
45. The termination clause in the merger agreement (the first step in the arrange-
ment) expressly stated that the merger agreement terminated if the reorganization agree-
ment (the second step) terminated prior to the merger's closing date. Thus, the two steps
were contingent upon one another. The "merger agreement would bear no fruit unless
the two-step series could be completed." Associated Wholesale Grocers, 927 F.2d at 1528.
Moreover, the interconnection between the two transactions was sometimes explicitly ac-
knowledged by the documents. For example, the reorganization agreement specifically
provided that Super Market Developers was to purchase from Elder, Inc. the following:
[A]II of the assets of every kind and description acquired by [Elder, Inc.] pursuant
to the Agreement of Merger, except for the shares of common stock of Weston.
As part of the consideration [Super Market Developers] agrees to assume and
discharge all of the obligations and liabilities of [Elder, Inc.] which were formerly
the obligations and liabilities of [Weston Investment] and which became the obli-
gations and liabilities of [Elder, Inc.] pursuant to the Agreement of Merger.
The effective date of the merger agreement was actually set forth in the reorganization
agreement, and the closing of the transactions described in the reorganization agreement
were to take place on the same day as the merger date, immediately following the time of
effectiveness of the merger. In addition to buttressing the interdependence of the two
steps, this provision placed the two steps as occurring at essentially the same point in time.
This close timing of the steps was also relied upon by the Tenth Circuit in evaluating the
step transaction doctrine, as it has by other courts and commentators.
Whether the Tenth Circuit would have found it more difficult to apply the "interde-
pendence" test in the absence of these explicit provisions in the documents is uncertain,
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steps of the arrangement were sufficiently interdependent so as to in-
voke the step transaction doctrine, with the result that the claimed capi-
tal loss was disallowed.
The taxpayer in Associated Wholesale Grocers contended that the step
transaction doctrine simply has no application where a valid or legiti-
mate business reason for structuring the transaction in a particular man-
ner can be identified. Here, Associated Wholesale Grocers argued that
the elimination of Weston Investment's minority shareholders provided
a sufficient business purpose to override the application of the step
transaction doctrine. After noting that the relationship between the step
transaction doctrine and a purported "valid business purpose" doctrine
was unclear, the Tenth Circuit "reject[ed] the contention that a valid
business purpose bars application of step transaction analysis in this




Application of the step transaction doctrine in Associated Wholesale
Grocers was a matter of first impression for the Tenth Circuit. The case
shows that the Tenth Circuit is willing to apply the step transaction doc-
trine with vigor in appropriate circumstances, and its recognition and
application of the "end result" test and the "interdependence" test
should be kept in mind by taxpayers and their advisors when structuring
corporate reorganizations.
II. SUBSTITUTE RETURN PREPARED BY INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE NOT
A "FILED RETURN" FOR PURPOSES OF DISCHARGEABILITY IN
BANKRUPTCY: BERGSTROM V. UNITED STATES
4 8
A. Background
The Code permits the Secretary of the Treasury ("the Secretary")
to prepare a federal income tax return for any person who fails to do so
as required by law. 49 In the context of a liquidation proceeding under
Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, an individual debtor may not receive
a discharge from any debt for a tax with respect to which a return, if
but provisions such as these certainly made the task easier. Cf BrrrKER at 4.3.5. ("At
one extreme, if the parties have agreed to take a series of steps, no one of which will be
legally effective unless all are consummated, application of the step transaction doctrine is
ordinarily assured.").
46. Associated Wholesale Grocers, 927 F.2d at 1527.
47. The Tenth Circuit shared "the government's skepticism as to the alleged signifi-
cance of taxpayer's claimed business purpose." Id. Since the "taxpayer never made any
inquir... as to the willingness of the minority shareholders to sell their.., shares ... at
any price ... we reject the suggestion that taxpayer's 'purpose' in designing the merger
and reorganization transaction was to resolve that problem." Id. at 1527 n.16.
48. 949 F.2d 341 (10th Cir. 1991).
49. I.R.C. § 6020(b)(1) (1988). The substitute return may be prepared on a Form
1040, In re Chastang, 116 B.R. 833 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990), or on a Form 870, In re
D'Avanza, 101 B.R. 787 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1989).
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required, was not filed.50 The issue in Bergstrom was whether a substitute
return prepared by the IRS, but never signed by the taxpayer, consti-
tutes a "filed" return for purposes of the Bankruptcy Code, so that the
tax shown on the substitute return is dischargeable in a Chapter 7
liquidation.
B. Facts
Bergstrom had failed to file federal income tax returns for 1979,
1980 and 1981. The IRS prepared substitute returns for those years.
Bergstrom did not participate in the preparation of the substitute re-
turns, nor did he sign them. The substitute returns calculated Berg-
strom's tax liability based upon information obtained from his W-2 and
1099 forms; however, the returns did not include any deductions. Based
upon the substitute returns, Bergstrom was mailed a statutory notice of
deficiency for each of the three years.
Subsequent to receiving the notice of deficiency, Bergstrom filed a
Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. The case was determined to be a "no
asset" case, and a final decree was entered on April 12, 1989. However,
the bankruptcy court subsequently reopened the case on Bergstrom's
motion when the IRS began collection proceedings based on claimed
deficiencies arising from the 1979, 1980 and 1981 notices of deficiency.
Bergstrom then filed a motion to determine tax liability, which the bank-
ruptcy court denied. Bergstrom appealed the denial to the district
court, which affirmed. In its "Order Affirming Decision of Bankruptcy
Court With Findings,"'5 1 the district court found that the issues raised in
the case were matters of first impression in the Tenth Circuit, and that
the body of law in the area was sparse.52 Bergstrom appealed to the
Tenth Circuit.
C. The Tenth Circuit's Opinion
To determine whether substitute returns prepared by the IRS
should be considered filed returns for purposes of the Bankruptcy Code
discharge rules, entitling Bergstrom to a discharge of the tax liability
arising out of the substitute returns filed for him, the Tenth Circuit5 3
first considered the language of section 523(a) of the Bankruptcy
Code.54 The court found that this statute clearly provides that "[a]n
individual's tax liability is nondischargeable in bankruptcy when the lia-
50. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(B)(i) (1988).
51. The district court decision was unreported.
52. Bergstrom, 949 F.2d at 342.
53. ChiefJudge McKay, Judge Barrett and Judge Brorby constituted the three-judge
panel.
54. 11 U.S.C..§ 523(a) (1988) provides in relevant part that:
(a) A discharge under Section 727 .... does not discharge an individual debtor
from any debt-
(1) fora tax...
(B) with respect to which a return, if required-
(i) was not filed ....
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bility results from the individual's failure to file a return." 55 The Tenth
Circuit noted that the legislative history of this section also provides that
"included in the nondischargeable debts are taxes for which the debtor
had not filed a required return as of the petition date or for which a
return had been filed beyond its last permitted due date."' 56 "[Tihe
debtor should not be able to use bankruptcy to escape these kinds of
taxes [arising from his deliberate misconduct]. Therefore, these taxes
have no priority in payment from the estate that survive as continuing
debts after the case."
57
The Tenth Circuit then disagreed with the district court's conclu-
sion that the body of law in this area was sparse. In fact, the Tenth
Circuit noted, "[m]any other courts have addressed the issue of whether
a substitute return constitutes a filed return, and they have found that it
does not."58 In In re Pruitt,59 the law and its policy underpinnings were
succinctly stated as follows:
Plaintiff's interpretation of 26 U.S.C. § 6020 and
§ 523(a)(1)(B), would result in encouragement of non-filing of
tax returns. Any taxpayer could simply refuse to file a tax re-
turn for a taxable year. Eventually, the IRS would file a substi-
tute return on behalf of the taxpayer pursuant to § 6020. The
filing of such a substitute return is a simple administrative step
which allows the assessment and collection process to begin.
The result of completing this necessary IRS administrative pro-
cedure would be to effectively excuse the non-filing taxpayer
from his own deliberate misconduct. After a few years the
taxes would then be ordinarily dischargeable. Such an inter-
pretation would render § 523(a)(1)(B) a nullity.
The plain language of the section, as well as the purpose
behind its enactment, require that the debtors have filed the
return.
6 0
In the Tenth Circuit's view, the provisions of the Code allowing the
Secretary to prepare a substitute return "provides the IRS with some
recourse if a taxpayer fails to file a return . ., but.., it does not excuse a
taxpayer from the filing requirement." 6 1 Finding itself in complete ac-
The rule is equally applicable to discharges under Chapter I I and Chapter 13.
55. Bergstrom, 949 F.2d at 342.
56. S. REP. No. 95-989,95th Cong., 2d Sess. 78 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5787, 5864.
57. S. REP. No. 95-1106, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1978).
58. Bergstrom, 949 F.2d at 343. The cases include In re Wrench, 129 B.R. 649, 651
(Bankr. D. Kan. 1991); In re Chastang, 116 B.R. 833, 834 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990); In re
Crawford, 115 B.R. 381, 382-83 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1990) ("The return must have been filed
by the debtor in order for the tax obligation to be dischargeable under § 523(a)(1)(B).");
In re D'Avanza, 101 B.R. 787, 789 (Bankr. M.D.Fla. 1989); In re Hofmann, 76 B.R. 853, 854
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1987); In re Haywood, 62 B.R. 482, 485 (Bankr. D. Ill. 1986) (Section
523(a)(1)(B) was meant to "encourage honest and self-generated reporting by taxpayers,
not to immunize non-reporting debtors who, once caught, seek to discharge their discov-
ered tax obligations along with other debts in Bankruptcy.").
59. 107 B.R. 764 (Bankr. D. Wyo. 1989).
60. Id at 766.
61. Bergstrom, 949 F.2d at 343.
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cord with the prior decisions, and unwilling to allow Bergstrom to re-
ceive any advantage from his failure to file returns for the years in
question, the Tenth Circuit held that "substitute returns do not consti-
tute filed returns in the absence of the signature of the taxpayer."
62
Although conceding that substitute returns prepared by the Secretary
are considered to be "prima facie good and sufficient for all legal pur-
poses" 6 3 by the Code, the Tenth Circuit nevertheless concluded that the
return prepared by the Secretary "must be signed by the delinquent tax-
payer before it can be accepted as the filed return of the taxpayer."
64
Bergstrom had never signed the substitute returns; therefore, they could
not be considered "filed" by him, and no discharge of the tax liability
arising from the returns was available.
In a related issue, Bergstrom had contended that penalties assessed
in connection with the substitute returns were dischargeable because
they were imposed on an event which occurred more than three years
prior to the filing of bankruptcy. 6 5 The district court had agreed with
the IRS that such penalties were not dischargeable. However, in a later
case,6 6 the Tenth Circuit held that tax penalties assessed in connection
with tax years more than three years prior to the filing of bankruptcy
were dischargeable. Therefore, the Tenth Circuit reversed the determi-
nation of the district court, and held that the penalties imposed on Berg-
strom's 1979, 1980 and 1981 federal income tax returns were
dischargeable because they related to an event occurring more than
three years prior to his 1988 bankruptcy petition.
D. Summary
Although a matter of first impression in the Tenth Circuit, the
nondischargeability of tax liabilities arising from the filing of a substitute
return is supported by substantial law in the bankruptcy area.
67 Pruitt
well articulates the strong and persuasive policy reasons for the require-
ment that discharges are only available for returns actually "filed" by the
debtor. As now acknowledged by the Tenth Circuit, taxpayers should
not be rewarded in bankruptcy by extending discharges to them as to tax
liabilities that they have attempted to keep secret and have not volunta-
rily reported.
III. PRESUMPTION OF CORRECTNESS AFFORDED TO STATUTORY NOTICES
OF DEFICIENCY: ERICKSON V. COMMISSIONER
6 8
A. Background
Notices of deficiency issued by the Commissioner of Internal Reve-
62. Id.
63. I.R.C. § 6020(b)(2) (1988).
64. Bergstrom, 949 F.2d at 341. See I.R.C. § 6020(a) (1988).
65. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7)(B) (1988).
66. In re Roberts, 906 F.2d 1440 (10th Cir. 1990).
67. See supra note 58.
68. 937 F.2d 1548 (10th Cir. 1991).
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nue ("the Commissioner") in a civil tax case 69 are presumptively cor-
rect, and the taxpayer who wishes to challenge the notice bears the
burden of coming forward with sufficient evidence to overcome the pre-
sumption of correctness. 70 However, there must be some reasonable
foundation for the notice in order to preserve the presumption, and
where the notice lacks a rational basis, the presumption does not ap-
ply. 7 1 Thus, purely arbitrary notices are not entitled to a presumption
of correctness. 7 2 In Erickson, the Tenth Circuit was asked to apply these
standards to a notice of deficiency issued to a convicted drug trafficker.
A related issue raised by Erickson involves the manner in which the
Commissioner will be allowed to reconstruct a taxpayer's taxable in-
come to provide a mathematical basis for the deficiency asserted in the
notice. It is well-established that the Commissioner has
great latitude in making determinations of liability, particularly
where the taxpayer files no returns and refuses to cooperate in
the ascertainment of his income. Thus, [the Commissioner] is
entitled to use any reasonable means of reconstructing income.
Further, he is given greater latitude in. determining which
method of reconstruction to apply where the case involves an
illegal enterprise in which the taxpayer has failed to file a return
and has kept no records.
73
One method of reconstructing income, the cash expenditures method of
reconstruction, assumes "absent some explanation by the taxpayer, that
the amount by which a taxpayer's expenditures during a taxable period
exceed his reported income has taxable origins." 74
B. Facts
In May 1983, Sidney Erickson took off from Belize in a Cessna 404.
The flight was monitored by United States customs officers through the
use of a transponder planted in the Cessna. Erickson was arrested after
his plane was forced down by the officers onto an airfield in Moses, New
Mexico. Erickson was the sole occupant of the plane, which was found
to contain approximately 2420 pounds of marijuana. Erickson was sub-
sequently convicted in federal court of importing marijuana and pos-
sessing it with intent to distribute, and his conviction was affirmed by the
Tenth Circuit in 1984.
7 5
Erickson maintained three bank accounts in various locations, each
69. See I.R.C. § 6212 (1988).
70. Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933); Jones v. Commissioner, 903 F.2d
1301, 1303 (10th Cir. 1990); Zell v. Commissioner, 763 F.2d 1139, 1141 (10th Cir. 1985).
If the taxpayer can rebut the presumption, the burden of proof shifts to the
Commissioner.
71. Jones, 903 F.2d 1301, 1304 (10th Cir. 1990); Llorente v. Commissioner, 649 F.2d
152, 156 (2d Cir. 1981).
72. )lorente, 649 F.2d at 156.
73. Carson v. United States, 560 F.2d 693, 693-94 (5th Cir. 1977).
74. Erickson v. Commissioner, 937 F.2d 1548, 1553 (10th Cir. 1991); Burgo v. Com-
missioner, 69 T.C. 729, 742 (1978).
75. United States v. Erickson, 732 F.2d 788 (10th Cir. 1984).
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of which reflected very low balances in 1983. Nevertheless, Erickson
had managed to pay for various expenses in 1983 totalling approxi-
mately $75,000 in either cash or cashier's checks. 76 Erickson owned a
second plane and maintained a hangar in Grand Junction, Colorado,
and some of his expenses related to the maintenance of the plane and
the hangar. Additionally, the Commissioner estimated Erickson's
purchase price for the 2420 pounds of marijuana at $200,000.
In 1984, the Commissioner issued a statutory notice of deficiency to
Erickson, which reconstructed his income by reference to his cash ex-
penditures. 7 7 Upon review of a petition filed by Erickson, the Tax Court
upheld the Commissioner's determination 78 despite Erickson's claim
that the 1984 notice of deficiency was unsupported by any factual basis
and was therefore arbitrary and erroneous. Erickson appealed to the
Tenth Circuit, which affirmed.
C. The Tenth Circuit's Opinion
On appeal, Erickson argued that there was an insufficient factual
basis to support the presumed correctness of the 1984 notice of defi-
ciency, unless the Commissioner could produce evidence directly con-
necting him to the business of illegal drug activity as a source of taxable
funds, i.e., proof of drug sales or proof that he actually purchased the
marijuana. The Tenth Circuit 79 disagreed, holding that the Commis-
sioner was only required to link Erickson to the liquid assets connected
to the activity to preserve the presumption. Summarizing prior cases,8 0
the court stated the following:
Once the Commissioner demonstrated sufficient minimal facts
to show an ownership interest in assets possessed by the tax-
payers, the presumption of correctness remained with the no-
tice of deficiency and the taxpayers had the burden of
satisfactorily explaining how they came to possess the liquid as-
sets, and to show why the assets did not represent taxable in-
come in the year in question.
8 1
Erickson apparently argued, at least implicitly, that he was merely a pi-
lot-for-hire, or "mule," and did not have an ownership interest in the
marijuana. This argument, however, was not necessarily supported by
76. These expenditures included the payment of his appearance bond in the amount
of $50,000, paid to the Clerk of the Court in Albuquerque, New Mexico in $20 bills.
77. Including the estimated $200,000 purchase price for the marijuana and the
$50,000 appearance bond, these expenditures totalled to $275,079. The notice of defi-
ciency asserted an income tax deficiency for 1983 in the amount of $202,217 including
additions to tax.
78. Erickson v. Commissioner, 58 T.C.M. (CCH) 352 (1989).
79. Judge Anderson and Judge McWilliams, together with Judge Wayne E. Alley,
United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, sitting by designation,
made up the three-judge panel.
80. Delaney v. Commissioner, 743 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1984); Schad v. Commissioner,
87 T.C. 609 (1986), aff'd withoutpublished opinion, 827 F.2d 774 (11 th Cir. 1987); Tokarski
v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 74 (1986).
81. Erickson v. Commissioner, 937 F.2d 1548, 1551-52 (10th Cir. 1991).
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the record 2 and, on balance, the Tenth Circuit viewed Erickson's cash
transactions and his ownership of a hangar and two planes as consistent
with a proprietary interest in the plane's cargo.
The possession or ownership of marijuana, of course, is not a taxa-
ble transaction. Erickson's ownership or possessory interest in the
seized marijuana would be relevant to the presumed correctness of the
notice of deficiency only if it was probative of associated transactions
indicating cash receipts by Erickson that would be taxable. The ques-
tion thus became whether Erickson's possession of the marijuana was
sufficient evidence of cash transactions entered into by him in connec-
tion with an income-producing activity.
The Tenth Circuit disposed of this question by recognizing the
cash-intensive nature of the drug trade. The court stated that it was not
an
impermissible stretch to assume that someone who is import-
ing more than a ton of marijuana into the United States by air
paid for the drugs in cash at a time proximate to the date of the
shipment. This is enough to provide a rational underpinning
for the notice of deficiency. .... 83
The Tenth Circuit thus allowed the Commissioner to "boot-strap" his
way to showing that Erickson possessed taxable funds, by pointing to
the fact that Erickson was in possession of a commodity generally known
to trade only in a cash market.
84
The Tenth Circuit would have sustained the notice of deficiency
based solely on the Commissioner having provided a factual foundation
upon which it was rational to conclude that Erickson had an ownership
or possessory interest in the marijuana, and thus funds that (in the ab-
sence of an explanation) were taxable. Both Erickson and the govern-
ment, however, apparently believed that it was necessary to examine the
government's actual application of the cash expenditures method of in-
come reconstruction utilized to generate the notice of deficiency. Erick-
son argued that the Commissioner's application of the cash
expenditures method of income reconstruction was deficient in this case
because the Commissioner had failed to establish Erickson's net worth
at the beginning and the end of taxable year 1983. According to Erick-
son, the failure of the Commissioner to do so precluded the Commis-
sioner from ruling out the possibility that Erickson's cash expenditures
82. During the course of the criminal proceedings, Erickson had filed a motion to
suppress on the basis that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the airplane,
which had been violated by the government when it installed the transponder to monitor
the flight. Following a suppression hearing, the district court determined that Erickson
had failed to establish a legitimate expectation of privacy by proving lawful ownership or a
sufficient possessory interest in the plane containing the marijuana. However, during that
hearing, Erickson admitted that he had an "ownership or possessory interest" in the mari-
juana cargo. Id. at 1549.
83. Id. at 1552.
84. The Tenth Circuit reserved judgment on the situation where the taxpayer is in
possession or has ownership of illiquid assets. "In a proper case such evidence may pro-
vide sufficient linkage to other evidence to justify a notice of deficiency." Id. at 1552 n.4.
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in 1983, including those made to purchase the marijuana, came from
savings derived from a nontaxable or previously taxed source of funds
owned by Erickson at the beginning of the year but dissipated by the
time of his arrest.
The Tenth Circuit refused to accept the proposition that the Com-
missioner must establish opening and dosing net worths "for drug traf-
fickers who specialize in secrecy, deception, and evasion." 8 5 To retain
the presumption of correctness for the notice of deficiency, "the Com-
missioner is not obliged to establish a net worth when applying the cash
expenditures method for notices of deficiency in civil tax cases"8 6 if the
Commissioner has reasonably linked the taxpayer to specific expendi-
tures in issuing a notice of deficiency based on those expenditures. The
Tenth Circuit thus upheld the Tax Court's determination that Erickson
had failed to carry his burden of proving that the notice of deficiency
was arbitrary or erroneous.8 7
D. Summary
The Tenth Circuit viewed the Erickson case as one "which has been
searching for a coherent legal theory in the wrong places." 8 8 Although
both the taxpayer and the government had apparently spent considera-
ble energy addressing the technical requirements of the cash expendi-
tures method of reconstructing income, "[tihere is only one rule, that
there be some rational underpinning [for the notice of deficiency]. Es-
tablishing a minimal evidentiary foundation can be done in a variety of
ways, and no rigid formulations are required."8 9 Here, the Commis-
sioner had established a rational basis for the notice of deficiency by
providing a factual foundation linking Erickson to a source of unre-
ported income. Having thus preserved the notice's presumption of cor-
rectness, the Commissioner prevailed on the overall merits when the
taxpayer offered no evidence to overcome the presumption.
While Erickson seems to provide a relatively lax evidentiary hurdle
for the Commissioner to dear in preserving the presumption of correct-
ness afforded to his notices of deficiency, the factual setting should be
kept in mind. The Tenth Circuit has shown itself to be fairly open-
minded in considering taxpayer challenges to the correctness of notices
of deficiency in other contexts. At the end of 1991, in Hagen v. Commis-
85. Id. at 1554. The Tenth Circuit viewed this undertaking as a "daunting burden"
and one "likely to be so wildly inaccurate through no fault of the Commissioner as to be of
little real probative value." Id"
86. Id.
87. A finding by the Tax Court that a taxpayer has failed to carry his burden of prov-
ing that the notice of deficiency is arbitrary or erroneous is factual and may not be set aside
unless dearly erroneous. 26 U.S.C. § 7482(a) (1988); FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a); Marathon Oil
Co. v. Commissioner, 838 F.2d 1114 (10th Cir. 1987); Dolese v. Commissioner, 811 F.2d
543 (10th Cir. 1987). On the other hand, findings of law and of ultimate fact are subject to
de novo review. Pollei v. Commissioner, 877 F.2d 838 (10th Cir. 1989).




sioner,90 the Tenth Circuit concluded that the taxpayer had made a legiti-
mate challenge to the reasonableness of the method used by the IRS to
reconstruct his income, 9 1 and that the IRS had not adequately re-
sponded to the challenge in its brief on appeal. The case was remanded
to determine if the IRS could adequately address the taxpayer's argu-
ments and establish a rational basis for the method it used to calculate
the asserted deficiencies. Thus, although the presumption of correct-
ness is strong, it can be overcome and the burden can be shifted to the
IRS by showing that the underlying theory of income reconstruction is
faulty or illogical.
IV. GUARANTEE BY SHAREHOLDER OF S CORPORATION'S DEBT DOES
NOT CREATE BASIS IN SHAREHOLDER'S STOCK: GOATCHER V.
UNITED STATES
9 2 
AND URI V. COMMISSIONER
9 3
A. Background
Under Subchapter S of the Code, corporations may elect to be
treated as pass-through entities for federal income tax purposes. 94 Cor-
porations filing the appropriate election, and thereby becoming "S cor-
porations," will be treated in a manner similar, although not identical, to
partnerships. Items of an S corporation's income, gain, loss, deduction
and credit are not taxed to the corporation, but are "passed through"
and allocated among its shareholders on apro rata basis, based upon the
shareholders' relative interests in the corporation.9 5
An S corporation that generates a taxable loss during the year must
allocate that loss pro rata among its shareholders. However, the aggre-
gate amount of losses and deductions that may be taken into account
and deducted by a shareholder in an S corporation for any taxable year
may not exceed the sum of the adjusted basis of the shareholder's stock
in the corporation 9 6 and the shareholder's adjusted basis of any indebt-
edness of the S corporation to the shareholder.9 7 A shareholder in an S
90. The Order andJudgment of the Tenth Circuit is unpublished, but can be found at
92-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,030. The Order and Judgment has no precedential value
and may not be cited or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except for purposes of
establishing the doctrines of law of the case, resjudicata, or collateral estoppel. lOT CIR.
R. 36.3.
91. The method at issue was the bank deposits method of income reconstruction,
which reconstructs income by reference to deposits and withdrawals from the taxpayer's
bank accounts. The taxpayer was a registered securities broker-dealer, and he argued that
the IRS had not valued his beginning and closing inventories of securities properly and
had not appropriately reconstructed the manner in which he should report short sales.
Ultimately, this method was claimed to illogically reflect the taxpayer's cost of goods sold
as reflected in the notice of deficiency.
92. 944 F.2d 747 (10th Cir. 1991).
93. 949 F.2d 371 (10th Cir. 1991).
94. I.R.C. §§ 1361-1379 (1988). A Subchapter S election can be made if the defini-
tional requirements of I.R.C. § 1362 are satisfied.
95. Id- § 1366(a).
96. Id § 1366(d)(1)(A).
97. Id § 1366(d)(1)(B). The basis of the shareholder in her stock (and in the indebt-
edness of the S corporation owed to her) is increased and decreased pursuant to the ad-
justment and ordering rules set forth in I.R.C. § 1367.
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corporation that is expected to generate substantial operating losses is
therefore well advised to structure his affairs to maximize the basis of his
stock in the S corporation, and not unduly "waste" the resulting loss
deduction.
98
When an S corporation needs to borrow funds, tax counselors gen-
erally advise that the shareholders, rather than the corporation, obtain
the loan and then either contribute the loan proceeds to the corporation
as a contribution to capital, thus increasing the shareholders' bases in
their stock, or loan those proceeds to the corporation, thus creating ba-
sis in the form of indebtedness of the corporation to the shareholders.
Occasionally, shareholders do not receive or heed such advice, 99 and
later argue that the manner in which the funds were actually borrowed
nevertheless created additional basis for the shareholders, against which
they may claim allocable losses of the S corporation. This situation typ-
ically occurs when the corporation borrows the funds directly and the
shareholders guarantee repayment of the loan. The shareholders then
argue that the guarantee is akin to a capital contribution to the corpora-
tion, thus increasing the basis of their stock.
Courts have been split as to whether a shareholder of an S corpora-
tion may successfully claim that the adjusted basis in his stock includes a
pro rata share of the amount of a corporate loan he personally guaran-
tees. In Selfe v. United States,100 the Eleventh Circuit approved a theory
of prorated inclusion of personal loan guarantees in basis. The Elev-
enth Circuit looked to whether the lender relied primarily on the share-
holder or the corporate entity for repayment of the loan, and remanded
the case for a factual determination of this issue. In Estate of Leavitt v.
Commissioner' 0 ' and Brown v. Commissioner,10 2 the Fourth and Sixth Cir-
cuits, respectively, disapproved the Selfe-type analysis, determining that
S corporation shareholders must abide by the form of the transaction as
structured by them, "rather than using hindsight to construct an expla-
nation of the transaction which gives them the best tax result."' 0 3
Under this analysis, the S corporation shareholder must actually be
called upon to make good on the loan and, once having made payment
on the loan, may add the amount of that payment to the basis of his
stock.
B. Facts and the Tenth Circuit's Opinions
The taxpayers in Goatcher were a husband and wife who had formed
98. Under I.R.C. § 1366(d)(2), any loss or deduction which is disallowed for any taxa-
ble year by reason of the basis limitations is treated as having been incurred by the corpo-
ration in the succeeding taxable years with respect to that shareholder; that is, there is an
indefinite carry-over of the disallowed loss or deduction, which may be claimed by the
shareholder only when she has developed additional basis in her S corporation stock.
99. Of course, in some cases, practical, legal, or financial considerations may preclude
such an arrangement.
100. 778 F.2d 767 (11th Cir. 1985).
101. 875 F.2d 420 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 958 (1989).
102. 706 F.2d 755 (6th Cir. 1983).
103. Uri v. Commissioner, 949 F.2d 371, 373 (10th Cir. 1991).
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an Oklahoma corporation electing status as an S corporation to con-
struct and operate a cable TV system in four Oklahoma communities.
After contributing $1000 to the capital of the corporation, the share-
holders caused the corporation to borrow in excess of $1,000,000 in a
series of loans that were personally guaranteed by the taxpayers. The
taxpayers were never called upon to pay the guarantees. In 1982 and
1983, the corporation generated approximately $91,000 of operating
losses, which the taxpayers claimed on their personal income tax re-
turns. The IRS limited the pass-through of these losses to the amount
of the taxpayers' $1000 initial capital contribution. After unsuccessfully
suing the government in district court for the amount of the resulting
tax deficiency,' 0 4 the taxpayers appealed to the Tenth Circuit, which
affirmed.
The Tenth Circuit'0 5 adopted the reasoning of Leavitt, holding that
there must be an economic outlay on the part of the shareholder to in-
crease the basis of his stock in an S corporation.' 0 6 A personal guaran-
tee, in and of itself, does not satisfy the economic outlay requirement,
being merely a promise to pay in the future if called upon to do so. The
taxpayers predictably argued that, in substance, the guarantee amounted
to a loan to the taxpayers followed by their contribution of the loan to
the corporation. While sympathetic to the plight of the taxpayers, the
Tenth Circuit did not feel itself "free to call a carrot a cabbage to
achieve a desired result"' 0 7 and affirmed the district court's denial of
the loss deductions.
Uri involved two taxpayers, Cathaleen Uri and Stevens Townsdin,
who were partners in an accounting firm. In 1980, the taxpayers had
formed The Old Opera House Mall Company, a Kansas corporation that
elected to be taxed as an S corporation, for the purposes of renovating a
building in downtown Concordia, Kansas, and opening a small shopping
mall on the premises. Uri and Townsdin each contributed $10,000 in
cash to capitalize the corporation, and each received 50% of its stock.
The corporation then borrowed money from a local bank to repay in-
terim loans for construction and equipment. The loan was Secured by
the real estate and assets of the corporation, and by the personal guar-
antees of Uri and Townsdin. The Small Business Administration ("the
SBA") also guaranteed 90% of the loan.
The mall opened inJuly 1981, but byJuly 1982 had ceased all retail
operations. The SBA sent Uri and Townsdin demands under their guar-
antees after the note went into default and was accelerated. In response,
both Uri and Townsdin filed petitions under Chapter 7 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code, and the personal guarantees were discharged. Ultimately,
the corporation also filed for Chapter 7 liquidation. The Commissioner
104. The decision of the district court was unreported.
105. Judge Anderson, Judge Tacha and Judge Brorby constituted the three-judge
panel.
106. Goatcher v. United States, 944 F.2d 747, 751 (10th Cir. 1991).
107. Id. at 752.
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disallowed all pass-through corporate losses to the shareholders in ex-
cess of their $10,000 capital contributions for tax years 1982 and 1983.
The taxpayers filed unsuccessful petitions in the Tax Court1 0 8 and ap-
pealed to the Tenth Circuit.
The Tenth Circuit l0 9 was unmoved by the taxpayers' apparent con-
tention that the Chapter 7 liquidations somehow differentiated their
case from Goatcher, Leavitt, Brown and Harris v. United States. 110 The sig-
nificant personal loss suffered by them in bankruptcy did not satisfy the
requirement that there be an actual economic outlay by the shareholders
with respect to the guarantee in order to create additional basis in their
stock. I 11
C. Summary
The Tenth Circuit has clearly rejected Selfe in favor of the more
rigid requirement that taxpayers must follow the road map set out in the
Code to receive basis credit for loans to S corporations. Arguments of
"substance over form" will not carry the day for S corporation share-
holders who fail to properly structure their affairs. The treatment of S
corporation loans is simply another area of tax law where form must be
scrupulously observed if the desired tax results are to be achieved.
112 If
the shareholders of an S corporation in the Tenth Circuit are to maxi-
mize their ability to claim their allocable share of the corporation's oper-
ating losses, any loan to the S corporations should first be carefully
structured as a loan to the shareholders and not to the corporation. The
shareholders must then either contribute the proceeds of the loan to the
corporation, or loan the proceeds to the corporation, to receive "credit"
in calculating the shareholders' bases in their S corporation stock or
debt against which they may claim such losses.
V. AUTHORITY OF THE COMMISSIONER TO REQUIRE CHANGES IN




The Code provides that whenever the use of inventory is necessary
in order clearly to determine the income of any taxpayer, inventory is to
108. Uri v. Commissioner, 56 T.C.M. (CCH) 1217 (1989).
109. Judge Holloway, Judge Baldock and JudgeJ. Thomas Greene, United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Utah, sitting by designation, made up the three-judge panel.
110. 902 F.2d 439 (5th Cir. 1990). In Harris, the Fifth Circuit joined the Fourth and
Sixth Circuits in their treatment of this issue, leaving the Eleventh Circuit alone in its
"facts and circumstances" analysis.
111. The taxpayers in Uri had also argued that the loan was in substance a loan to the
taxpayers and a subsequent contribution by them of funds to the corporation because it
had been made by the lender primarily on its assessment of, and reliance upon, the
strength of the taxpayers' personal financial worth and income. This argument was unsuc-
cessfully made in Goatcher and was rejected here as well.
112. Cf supra note 43.
113. 937 F.2d 510 (10th Cir. 1991).
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be taken by the taxpayer on such basis as the IRS may prescribe "as
conforming as nearly as may be to the best accounting practice in the
trade or business and as most clearly reflecting the income."' 14 Under
the applicable Treasury Regulations, the taking of inventory and the
utilization of an appropriate inventory accounting method are necessary
in every case in which the production, purchase, or sale of merchandise
is an income-producing factor.' 5
The Regulations further state that in "any case in which it is neces-
sary to use an inventory, the accrual method of accounting must be used
with regard to purchases and sales unless otherwise authorized."
' 16
However, the Commissioner may authorize a taxpayer "to continue the
use of a method of accounting consistently used by the taxpayer, even
though not specifically authorized... if, in the opinion of the Commissioner,
income is clearly reflected by the use of such method."' " 7 Ralston Development
Corp. presented the Tenth Circuit with an opportunity to apply the
"clear reflection of income" test for the first time in the circuit.
B. Facts
Ralston Development Corp. was engaged in the business of manu-
facturing water treatment control system parts and components. These
water control systems were apparently sold to Ralston's customers and
maintained by Ralston under maintenance contracts. For many years,
Ralston had used the accrual method of accounting for financial state-
ment purposes, but had used the cash receipts and disbursements
method of accounting in preparing its federal income tax returns.
1 1 8
114. I.R.C. § 471 (1988). Generally speaking, the issues arising under inventory ac-
counting include such questions as whether the basis of valuation is to be cost or lower of
cost or market; whether the inventory flow assumption is to be last-in, first-out (LIFO),
first-in, first-out (FIFO), or some other assumption; and whether the "full absorption"
method of inventory costing for manufacturers has been properly applied. None of these
issues were presented in Ralston Development Corp. Rather, the case centered around the
broader question of whether Ralston was entitled to use the cash receipts and disburse-
ments method of accounting, as opposed to the accrual method of accounting insisted
upon by the IRS.
115. Treas. Reg. § 1.471-1 (1960). Under Treas. Reg. § 1A71-2 (as amended in 1973),
it is acknowledged that I.R.C. § 471 provides two tests which each inventory accounting
method must satisfy. The method must (1) conform as nearly as possible to the best ac-
counting practice in the trade or business; and (2) clearly reflect income.
116. Treas. Reg. § 1A46-1(c)(2)(i) (as amended in 1987) (emphasis added). The
Tenth Circuit did not focus on the possible argument that Ralston was not engaged in the
purchase and sale of inventory, but was rather a manufacturer. It does not seem inappro-
priate, however, to require manufacturers to use accrual accounting if merchandising or-
ganizations must use that method.
117. Id. § IA46-1(c)(2)(ii) (emphasis added). It should be noted that, for tax years
beginning after December 31, 1986, a "C corporation"--which is presumably the type of
entity selected by Ralston-may not use the cash receipts and disbursements method of
accounting unless it is a "qualified personal service corporation" or has gross receipts of
not more than $5,000,000. I.R.C. § 448 (1988).
118. Under the cash receipts and disbursements method of accounting, "all items
which constitute gross income (whether in the form of cash, property, or services) are to
be included for the taxable year in which actually or constructively received" and expendi-
tures "are to be deducted for the taxable year in which actually made." Treas. Reg.
§ 1.446-1(c)(1)(i) (as amended in 1987).
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Although Ralston's federal income tax returns had been audited several
times over the years, the IRS had always approved Ralston's use of the
cash method for federal income tax purposes.
Ralston was once again audited in 1982, for its 1979, 1980, and
1981 tax years. As a result of this audit, the IRS determined that Ral-
ston's use of the cash method of accounting did not clearly reflect Ral-
ston's income, and required that Ralston switch to the accrual method of
accounting. 1 19 This and other adjustments resulted in sizeable tax defi-
ciencies for 1980 and 1981, which Ralston paid and for which Ralston
instituted a refund action in district court. Ajury trial resulted in ajudg-
ment for Ralston. 120 The government appealed to the Tenth Circuit,
which reversed.
C. The Tenth Circuit Opinion
On appeal, 12 ' Ralston conceded that inventories were a income-
producing factor in its business. Therefore, the issue was whether the
IRS had abused its discretion in determining that the cash method of
accounting utilized by Ralston did not clearly reflect its income.
122 If
the cash method of accounting did not dearly reflect Ralston's income,
the accrual method would be mandated.
123
The test developed by courts to determine whether a particular ac-
counting method clearly reflects income has come to be known as the
"substantial identity of results" test. Under this test, a taxpayer's
method of accounting is "sustainable only if it achieves results that are
virtually identical to the results that would be achieved under an accrual
method."124 This somewhat harsh test reflects the high degree of defer-
ence that courts consistently pay to the Commissioner in reviewing an
IRS determination that a particular accounting method used by a tax-
payer with inventories does not dearly reflect income.1 25
In Ralston, there were substantial differences between the results
119. Under the accrual method of accounting,
income is to be included for the taxable year when all the events have occurred
which tax the right to receive such income and the amount thereof can be deter-
mined with reasonable accuracy. Under such a method, deductions are allowable
for the taxable year in which all the events have occurred which establish the fact
of the liability giving rise to such deduction and the amount thereof can be deter-
mined with reasonable accuracy.
Id. § 1.446-1(c)(1)(ii).
120. There was no reported decision at the district court level.
121. The three-judge panel consisted of Judge Logan, Judge Moore and Judge J.
Thomas Greene, United States District Court for the District of Utah, sitting by
designation.
122. The accrual method insisted upon by the Commissioner applied to Ralston's en-
tire accounting system, not just to its inventories. "If the taxpayer must use inventories,
the Commissioner may also require it to adopt the accrual method." Knight-Ridder News-
papers, Inc. v. United States, 743 F.2d 781, 789 (11 th Cir. 1984). Of course, the greatest
monetary impact resulting from such a switch will be felt in the inventory area, since the
purchase and sale of inventory will comprise the largest element of taxable income.
123. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.446-1(c)(2)(i) and (ii) (as amended in 1987).
124. Ralston Development Corp. v. United States, 937 F.2d 510, 513 nA (10th Cir.
1991) (citation omitted).
125. See, e.g., Thor Power Tool Co. v. Commissioner, 439 U.S. 522, 532-33 (1979).
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obtained under the accrual method of accounting and the cash method
of accounting. The difference was apparently attributable to the fact
that certain contract retentions recognized by Ralston delayed the inclu-
sion in income of various amounts otherwise receivable from customers
purchasing the water control systems. Under the cash method of ac-
counting employed by Ralston, those receivables would not be included
in income until received. Under the accrual method of accounting, the
receivables would be currently included in income and matched against
the related expenses incurred by Ralston in the construction of the
water control systems. When compared to the use of the cash method of
accounting, utilization of the accrual method increased Ralston's gross
income by 157% in 1979, 36% in 1980 and 48% in 1981.126
Ralston argued that, notwithstanding these differences, the use of
the cash method of accounting, consistently applied over the years,
"clearly reflected" its income for the years in question. The Tenth Cir-
cuit's response is indicative of the high burden that taxpayers carry in
contending that some method of accounting, other than one sanctioned
by the IRS in the particular circumstance, clearly reflects income. The
Tenth Circuit simply viewed these contentions as essentially irrelevant
in the face of the fact that Ralston's cash method of accounting yielded
results that were not consistent with the accrual method of accounting
prescribed by the IRS. 12 7 Ralston had not contested the government's
calculation of the substantial differences achieved under the two meth-
ods of accounting for the years in question; thus, the Tenth Circuit had
little choice but to reverse ihe district court and uphold the Commis-
sioner's imposition of the accrual method of accounting.
D. Summary
Ralston Development Corp. is illustrative of the considerable burden
borne by taxpayers in the Tenth Circuit who use an accounting method
other than the accrual method prescribed by the IRS if those taxpayers
utilize inventories that are an income-producing factor. Unless the two
methods achieve a substantial identity of results, so that there is virtually
no difference between the two methods with respect to their impact on
the taxpayer's taxable income, the Commissioner's determination will
prevail, even if the taxpayer's method clearly reflects income in a gen-
eral sense.
126. Ralston Development Corp., 937 F.2d at 513.
127. In fact, courts have upheld the determination of the Commissioner where the dif-
ferences between the method preferred by the taxpayer and the method prescribed by the
Commissioner have been almost nonexistent. For example, in Wilkinson-Beane, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 420 F.2d 352-(lst Cir. 1970), the First Circuit held that the Commissioner
did not abuse his discretion when the difference between the two methods over the course
of five years was less than two-tenths of one percent. lId at 356.
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VI. No JUDiciAL REVIEW FOR INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE'S REFUSAL




If the amount of any tax imposed under the Code is not paid on or
before the last date prescribed for payment, interest on the underpay-
ment is imposed from the due date to the date paid 129 at statutorily
prescribed rates.13 0 The Internal Revenue Service has consistently
taken the position that it does not have the statutory authority to abate
this interest.1 3 ' However, new I.R.C. § 6404(e)(1), enacted as part of
the Tax Reform Act of 1986, now authorizes the Secretary of the Treas-
ury to abate interest to the extent that it is attributable to IRS errors or
delays in performing ministerial acts. 132 Selman examined whether a
taxpayer may obtain judicial review of an IRS decision not to abate
interest.
B. Facts
Robert Selman's 1981 and 1982 tax returns were audited in 1984.
The audit was concluded in 1985, and the IRS assessed substantial tax
deficiencies. Selman timely filed a written protest to the proposed ad-
justments. It was not until May 1987 that Selman and the IRS reached a
tentative settlement agreement. The settlement agreement was ac-
cepted by the Commissioner in August 1987, and the IRS assessed a
deficiency for 1981 and 1982, together with statutory interest for the
period during which the deficiency was outstanding.
In October 1987, before paying the assessed interest, Selman filed a
request with the IRS to abate a portion of the interest pursuant to the
provisions of I.R.C. § 6404(e)(1).13 3 Selman's argument was that the
128. 941 F.2d 1060 (10th Cir. 1991).
129. I.R.C. § 6601(a) (1988).
130. Id. § 6621.
131. "Except as specifically provided by statute,... there is no authority for waiving
interest on delinquent taxes or for refunding on equitable grounds interest that has been
legally assessed or collected." [2 Administration] I.R. Man. (CCH) pt. 5175.1(1), at 6303
(Oct. 31, 1989).
132. I.R.C. § 6404(e)(1) (1988) provides as follows:
(E) ASSESSMENTS OF INTEREST ATTRIBUTED TO ERRORS AND DELAYS BY INTERNAL
REVENUE SERVICE
(1) IN GENERAL
In the case of any assessment of interest on-
(A) any deficiency attributable in whole or in part to any error or delay
by an officer or employee of the Internal Revenue Service (acting in his
official capacity) in performing a ministerial act....
the Secretary may abate the assessment of all or any part of such interest for any
period. For purposes of the preceding sentence, an error or delay shall be taken
into account only if no significant aspect of such error or delay can be attributed
to the taxpayer involved, and after the Internal Revenue Service has contacted
the taxpayer in writing with respect to such deficiency or payment.
133. The request is filed on Form 843. See Rev. Proc. 87-42, 1987-2 C.B. 589.
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IRS, through its own errors or delays in performing ministerial acts,13 4
had caused the accumulation of at least a portion of the interest. The
IRS denied Selman's request, and over the next two years Selman paid
both the assessed tax and the interest. After filing an unsuccessful claim
for refund with the IRS, Selman brought a refund suit in district court,
contending that the IRS had abused its discretion in denying his abate-
ment request. The district court granted the IRS's motion to dismiss the
complaint on the ground that Selman's cause of action did not fall
within its subject matter jurisdiction, and alternatively, that even if the
court had subject matter jurisdiction, the decision whether to abate in-
terest was committed to agency discretion and was therefore not subject
to judicial review. 135 Selman appealed to the Tenth Circuit.
C. The Tenth Circuit's Opinion
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit13 6 affirmed the district court.
Although the Tenth Circuit concluded that the district court did have
subject matterjurisdiction over the action,' 3 7 it nevertheless affirmed on
the basis that the decision to abate interest is committed to agency dis-
cretion by law, and judicial review of the decision is therefore precluded.
134. The ministerial acts were not identified in either the district court or the Tenth
Circuit opinions. As to the nature of the ministerial acts envisioned, the legislative history
notes that the new law
applies only to failures to perform ministerial acts that occur after the IRS has
contacted the taxpayer in writing.... The committee intends that the term 'min-
isterial act' be limited to nondiscretionary acts where all the preliminary prerequi-
sites, such as conferencing and review by supervisors, have taken place.... The
IRS may define a ministerial act in regulations.
S. REP. No. 99-313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 208-9 (1988). Temp. Treas. Reg. § 301.6404-
2T(b)(1) (1987) defines a ministerial act as "a procedural or mechanical act that does not
involve the exercise ofjudgment or discretion, and that occurs during the processing of a
taxpayer's case after all prerequisites, such as conferences and review by supervisors, have
taken place." Examples set forth in id. § 301.6404-2T(b)(2) indicate that the phrase will be
narrowly construed, and specifically does not include decisions to delay examinations be-
cause of work priorities or resource limitations.
135. Selman v. United States, 733 F. Supp. 1444 (W.D. Okla. 1990). The district court
followed the reasoning and conclusions of Horton Homes, Inc. v. United States, 727 F.
Supp. 1450 (M.D. Ga. 1990), noting that "a case closer in point cannot be found." Selman,
733 F. Supp. at 1445. Addressing the identical issue, Horton Homes had concluded that the
court lacked subject matterjurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (1988), and that even if
it did have jurisdiction, the "no law to apply" standard developed in the text required a
conclusion that there is no right of judicial review under the Administrative Procedures
Act. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit disagreed with the first conclusion, but agreed with
the second. Horton Homes, Inc. v. Commissioner, 936 F.2d 548 (11th Cir. 1991). The
procedural history of Horton Homes thus closely parallels that of Selman.
136. Judge Logan and Judge Baldock, together with Judge Myron H. Bright, United
States Senior CircuitJudge for the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting by designation,
constituted the three-judge panel.
137. The jurisdictional question centered on the application of 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1)
(1988), which grants district courts original jurisdiction in actions brought to recover taxes
"alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected," or to recover "any
sum alleged to have been excessive ... under the internal-revenue laws." The district
court had focused solely on the first half of the statute and dismissed Selman's complaint
after concluding that his claim of abuse of discretion by the IRS did not amount to illegally
or erroneously collecting a tax. The Tenth Circuit reminded the district court that it also
had jurisdiction over claims based on allegedly excessive sums, and concluded that Sel-
man's was such a claim.
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Selman had contended that the Administrative Procedure Act' 3 8
extended authority to the district court to review the actions of the IRS
under the circumstances of his case. Under the Administrative Proce-
dure Act, however, judicial review cannot be obtained where either
"(1) statutes precludejudicial review; or (2) agency action is committed
to agency discretion by law."' 13 9 Since I.R.C. § 6404(e)(1) does not ex-
pressly preclude judicial review, the first exception did not apply, and
attention was focused on the second exception.
140
In considering whether the IRS's decision to abate interest under
I.R.C. § 6404(e)(1) is one that is "committed to agency discretion by
law," the Tenth Circuit noted that the second exception is triggered "in
those rare instances where 'statutes are drawn in such broad terms that
in a given case there-is no law to apply.' "141 In this connection, the
Supreme Court has stated that
even where Congress has not affirmatively precluded review,
review is not to be had if the statute is drawn so that a court
would have no meaningful standard against which to judge the
agency's abuse of discretion. In such a case, the statute ("law")
can be taken to have "committed" the decisionmaking to the
agency's judgment absolutely.
14 2
Selman argued that there was a meaningful standard against which
to judge the IRS's exercise of discretion. Selman pointed to a statement
in the congressional committee reports that "the provision be utilized in
instances where failure to abate interest would be widely perceived as grossly
unfair."' 4 s The Tenth Circuit disagreed, stating that:
Such an amorphous statement as "widely perceived as grossly
unfair" hardly provides a reviewing court with substantive stan-
dards by which to evaluate agency action .... [A]fter reviewing
the statement in context, we are convinced that Congress in-
tended this statement as an admonition to the Secretary to use
this authority sparingly, not as a substantive standard defining
when to abate. 14
4
As further support for its conclusion, the Tenth Circuit pointed out
138. 5 U.S.C. §§ 501-706 (1988).
139. Md § 701(a).
140. In Brahms v. United States, 18 Cl. Ct. 471 (1987), the Claims Court held that a
decision by the IRS not to abate interest under I.R.C. § 6404(e)(1) was not judicially re-
viewable. The court seemed to conclude that I.R.C. § 6404(e)(1) was a statute that pre-
cluded review by its terms because of the discretionary, rather than the mandatory, nature
of the IRS's authority to abate interest. In Selman, the Tenth Circuit employed the
mandatory-discretionary distinction to support its conclusion that the second exception
found in 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) applies to preclude review, rather than the first.
141. Selman v. United States, 941 F.2d 1060, 1063 (10th Cir. 1991) (quoting Citizens
to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 403, 410 (1971) (citation omitted)). At the
district court level, the taxpayers had argued that the "no law to apply" standard laid down
in Overton Park was "without foundation and fatally flawed," and urged the district court to
adopt a different test. Selman v. United States, 733 F. Supp. 1444, 1446 (W.D. Okla.
1990). The district court declined the invitation to depart from Supreme Court precedent.
142. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830 (1985).
143. H.R. REP. No. 99-426, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 844 (1986); S. REP. No. 99-313, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. 208 (1986) (emphasis added).
144. Selman, 941 F. 2d at 1063-64.
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that the language of I.R.C. § 6404(e)(1) is permissive, and not
mandatory. 14 5 The Tenth Circuit also noted that the legislative history,
as embodied in both the House and Senate reports, states that "[t]he
Act gives the IRS the authority to abate interest but does not mandate that it
do so (except that the IRS must do so in the case of certain erroneous
refunds ... ).-146 The distinction drawn by the legislative history be-
tween the authority and the obligation to abate interest "dearly evinces
Congress's intent to commit the abatement of interest pursuant to sub-
section (e)(1) to the discretion of the Secretary."' 4 7 Given the lan-
guage, structure and legislative history, of I.R.C. § 6404(e) (1), the Tenth
Circuit concluded that "Congress meant to commit the abatement of




Selman is unwelcome news for taxpayers who are assessed interest
on an underpayment of tax and who believe that a portion of the interest
assessment is due in whole or in part to errors or delays by ,the IRS.
Since it is now fairly established that judicial review is not available,
practical experience leads one to the pessimistic conclusion that abate-
ments under I.R.C. § 6404(e)(1) will be sparingly granted by the I.R.S.
VII. STATUS OF RESERVED INTEREST IN OIL AND GAS LEASE
DETERMINED TO BE OVERRIDING ROYALTY RATHER THAN
PRODUCTION PAYMENT: YATES V CoMMIsSIONER 
14 9
A. Background
When the owner of an oil and gas lease assigns his rights in the
145. I.R.C. § 6404(e)(1) (1988) states that "the Secretary may abate the assessment."
(Emphasis added). The word "'[m]ay,' unlike 'shall,' is not a word of command, but of
permission." Bergen v. United States, 569 F.2d 1197, 1198 n.3 (Ct. Cl. 1977), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 939 (1977). This language is to be contrasted with the language utilized in I.R.C.
§ 6404(e)(2) (1988), relating to interest abatements on erroneous refund checks. There,
the "Secretary shall abate the assessment of all interest on any erroneous refund .... " Id.
(emphasis added). "The fact that Congress employed both permissive and mandatory lan-
guage indicates that Congress intentionally sought to commit the former to the agency's
discretion while controlling the agency's action in the latter." Selman, 941 F.2d at 1064.
Selman had also argued that the doctrine of "no law to apply" should be curtailed by
the strong presumption favoring judicial review, which can only be overcome by clear and
convincing evidence of a contrary legislative intent. See, e.g., Abbott Lab. v. Gardner, 387
U.S. (1967). According to the Supreme Court, this burden can be carried "whenever the
congressional intent to preclude judicial review is 'fairly discernable in the statutory
scheme.'" Block v. Community Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 351 (quoting Data Process-
ing Serv. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 157 (1970)). Based upon the its analysis of the permis-
sive nature of I.R.C. § 6404(e)(1), the Tenth Circuit concluded that "congressional intent
to preclude judicial review is 'fairly discernible in the statutory scheme' of I.R.C.
§ 6404(e)." Selman, 941 F.2d at 1064.
146. Selman, 941 F.2d at 1064 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 99-426, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.
844 (1986); S. REP. No. 99-313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 208 (1986)).
147. Id.
148. Id. The Eleventh Circuit reached a similar conclusion in 1991. Horton Holmes,
Inc. v. United States, 936 F.2d 548 (11th Cir. 1991). See supra note 135.
149. 924 F.2d 967 (10th Cir. 1991).
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lease and retains an interest in either production or proceeds of produc-
tion, the interest of the assignor may take various forms. Generally, the
retained interest will be structured as an overriding royalty. If the re-
tained interest is a royalty, the assignment transaction will be treated as
a sublease and payments made to the holder of the royalty will be taxed
as ordinary income, subject to cost or percentage depletion. °50 If the
retained interest is structured as a "production payment," however, the
transaction will be treated as a sale, and income in respect of the pro-
duction payment may be reported as capital gain.
151
A production payment has been defined by the Supreme Court as
"the right to a specified sum of money, payable out of a specified per-
centage of the oil, or the proceeds received from the sale of such oil, if,
as and when produced."' 5
2
If an interest is to be classified as a production payment, the right
must have an expected useful life of shorter duration than the economic
life of the burdened mineral property. 153 In other words, the life of the
retained interest cannot be coextensive with the life of the burdened
property. In this regard, the Fifth Circuit, in United States v. Morgan,154
has stated the test as follows:
(1) Could ordinarily prudent persons dealing in mineral lands
or mineral leases, with knowledge of all facts then generally
known or ascertainable, upon reasonable inquiry, pertaining to
the lands and lease... involved, have reasonably expected, on
150. See I.R.C. §§ 613 and 613A (1988). The availability of percentage depletion to a
particular mineral interest owner is subject to various definitional and mathematical
limitations.
151. Whether a particular receipt constitutes ordinary income or capital gain had
greater consequences prior to the enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, which elimi-
nated the income tax bracket differential between ordinary income and capital gains.
However, that differential has been reinstated to a slight extent, see id § 1(h), and propos-
als are continuously being presented in Congress to reinstate a more substantial income
tax bracket differential between ordinary income and capital gains. See, e.g., § 2101 of
H.R. 4210, the ill-fated Tax Fairness and Economic Growth Act of 1992, passed by both
Houses of Congress on March 20, 1992, but immediately vetoed by President Bush.
Moreover, the characterization of an item as capital gain or loss has continuing signifi-
cance in the calculation of net capital gain or loss, see id § 1222, and limitations on the
deductibility of capital losses, see id § 1211.
152. Anderson v. Helvering, 310 U.S. 404, 410 (1940).
153. Treas. Reg. § 1.636-3(a)(1) (1973) defines the term "production payment" as the
following:
[A] right to a specified share of the production from mineral in place, (if, as, and
when produced), or the proceeds from such production. Such right must be an
economic interest in such mineral in place. It may burden more than one mineral
property, and the burdened mineral property need not be an operating mineral
interest. Such right must have an expected economic life (at the time of its creation) of shorter
duration than the economic life of one or more of the mineral properties burdened thereby. A
right to mineral in place which can be required to be satisfied by other than the
production of mineral from the burdened mineral property is not an economic
interest in mineral in place. A production payment may be limited by a dollar
amount, a quantum of material, or a period of time. A right to mineral in place has an
economic life ofshorter duration than the economic life ofa mineral property burdened thereby
only if such right may not reasonably be expected to extend in substantial amounts over the
entire productive life of such mineral property.
(Emphasis added).
154. 321 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1963).
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or about [the date of the assignment] that the alleged oil pay-
ment then reserved by taxpayer upon the .. assignment by
him of the mineral lease... would be paid out before the expi-
ration of the lease, and (2) did [taxpayer] then so expect? 155
Addressing the first, or objective, prong of this test, the Morgan
court noted:
[The IRS] has acknowledged in private letter rulings that the
possible classification of an oil payment as an overriding royalty
because its life may be coextensive with the life of the property
out of which it is payable can be successfully avoided by putting
a "floor" on the oil payment which would make it impossible
for the economic interest to extend over the life of the prop-
erty. For example, if the assignment creating the oil payment
provided that the interest would be extinguished when the esti-
mated recoverable reserves were reduced to a specified
amount, the term of the oil payment would not be coextensive
with the life of the property .... 156
These tax strategies were put to the test in Yates.
B. Facts
Yates had acquired three separate oil and gas leases of federal min-
erals through the federal noncompetitive lottery of oil and gas leases
conducted by the Bureau of Land Management of the U.S. Department
of Interior. 57 One of the leases, acquired in 1975, covered acreage in
Golden Valley County, North Dakota, while the other two leases, ac-
quired in 1977, covered acreage in Campbell County and Converse
County, Wyoming. 158 Yates had paid a $10 filing fee and a $1 per acre
annual delay rental for each lease. Yates assigned the Wyoming lease
acreage in 1981, and the North Dakota lease acreage in 1982, to three
separate corporations interested in exploring the acreage for oil.' 59
Each of the three lease assignments reserved an "overriding royalty" to
Yates that would terminate when 90% of the oil or gas had been pro-
duced. 160 In structuring the assignment, Yates and his advisor Mc-
155. I at 786.
156. Id. at 787 n.3 (quoting CLARK W. BREEDING & A. GORDON BURTON, INCOME TAXA-
TION OF OIL AND GAS PRODUCTION § 2.07 (1961)).
157. As required by 30 U.S.C. § 226(c) (1988), the lottery system leases were not
within known geological structures of a producing oil or gas field.
158. Campbell and Converse Counties are located in the Powder River Basin, which
attracted much drilling activity in the early 1980's.
159. For his $30 investment, and after paying annual delay rentals of approximately
$3735 per year, Yates received $112,000 from Davis Oil Co. for the Converse lease,
$309,147 from Lear Petroleum Exploration for the Campbell County lease, and $250,000
from Anadarko Production Co. for the Golden Valley lease. Yates v. Commissioner, 92
T.C. 1215, 1218 (1989).
160. The lease assignments designated the retained interests as overriding royalties;
however, this fact does not control the classification of the retained interest for federal
income tax purposes. See Commissioner v. P.G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260 (1950); Morgan,
321 F.2d 781. Treas. Reg. § 1.636-3(a)(2) (1973) also provides in part that:
A right which is in substance economically equivalent to a production payment
shall be treated as a production payment... regardless of the language used to
describe that right, the method of creation of such right, or the form in which
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Caw16 1 were apparently attempting to heed the advice cited in
Morgan 16 2 by placing a "floor" on the payment which would make it
impossible for the economic interest to extend over the entire life of the
burdened property.
Taking the position that the income should be classified as a pro-
duction payment, Yates reported the income paid to him by the lease
assignees as capital gain.1 63 The IRS took the position that the retained
interest was an overriding royalty, and thus the payments received by
Yates in 1981 and 1982 were advance payments on the royalties prior to
production, taxable as ordinary income subject to depletion. 16 4 Yates
filed a petition with the Tax Court, which sided with the IRS. 16 5 Yates
appealed to the Tenth Circuit.
C. The Tenth Circuit's Opinion
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit16 6 summarized the applicable Treas-
ury Regulations as generally requiring that a "production payment"
contain the following factors: (1) the income must derive from a right
to a specific share of a production; (2) this right must have an expected
economic life, at the time of its creation, of shorter duration than the
economic life of the mineral property; (3) the right must be an eco-
nomic interest in the mineral in place; (4) this right may only be satis-
fied by the production of the minerals; and (5) this right must be limited
such right is cast (even though such form is that of an operating mineral interest).
Whether or not a right is in substance economically equivalent to a production
payment shall be determined from all the facts and circumstances....
The language in each of the three lease assignments was essentially identical, provid-
ing that:
Assignor hereby excepts and reserves an overriding royalty of [varying percent-
ages] of the proceeds received from the sale of all (8/8ths) of the oil and gas
which may be produced.., from said lands ... until such time as the then estimated
recoverable reserves... are IOro or less whereupon said overriding royalty shall automatically
terminate....
Yates v. Commissioner, 924 F.2d 967, 969 (10th Cir. 1991) (emphasis added). The per-
centages were: Converse County, 5%; Campbell County, 7.5%o; and Golden Valley
County, 6.25%. Yates, 92 T.C. at 1218.
161. Jack McCaw was a landman and was manager of the land department at Yates
Petroleum Corp. Yates, 92 T.C. at 1217.
162. See supra text accompanying note 156.
163. The corporate assignors all deducted the payments as royalties. Yates, 92 T.C. at
1220.
164. The deficiencies were $131,475 for 1981 and $52,497 for 1982. Id. at 1216.
165. Yates, 92 T.C. 1215. Paraphrasing the Morgan test, the Tax Court analyzed the
question by inquiring:
[W]hether there was a reasonable prospect that the retained share of proceeds
from the oil produced from any of the subject properties, up to the time that 90
percent of the recoverable reserves had been extracted, would in substance be
paid out prior to the extraction of 100 percent of the recoverable reserves, and
whether petitioners so expected.
Id. at 1226.
Based upon Yates's own evidence that the prospects of productivity were one chance
in five, the Tax Court concluded that at the time of the assignments the likelihood of
commercial production was small. Id. at 1229. The payments from the corporate assignees
were thus held to be advances against an overriding royalty, taxable as ordinary income.




by either a dollar amount and a quantum of mineral or by a period of
time. 16 7 The parties and the court agreed that only the second of these
requirements was at issue in this case.
As stated in the Treasury Regulations, the right "must have an ex-
pected economic life (at the time of its creation) of shorter duration than the
economic life of one or more of the mineral properties burdened
thereby."1 68 The Tenth Circuit approved the standard applied by the
Tax Court1 6 9 and restated the standard in language employed by the
Fifth Circuit in Morgan:
[C]ould ordinarily prudent persons dealing in mineral
lands or mineral leases, with knowledge of all facts than gener-
ally known or ascertainable upon reasonable inquiry pertaining
to the lands and lease here involved, have reasonably expected
on [the date of each lease assignment], that the alleged oil pay-
ment then reserved by taxpayer... would be paid out before
the expiration of the lease, and .. .did [taxpayer] then so
expect?1
70
There was little question that Yates had a subjective expectation
that the lease acreage would be productive.' 7 ' The Tenth Circuit thus
turned to an examination of whether Yates had a reasonable objective
expectation that the reserved oil payment be paid out before the expira-
tion of the lease. If he did not, then the reserved interest would be
viewed as running coextensively with the life of the underlying lease,
and would thus be classifiable as a royalty.' 72 Stated another way, there
167. Yates v. Commissioner, 924 F.2d 967, 970 (10th Cir. 1991). The definition is
distilled from Anderson v. Helvering, 310 U.S. 404 (1940), and Thomas v. Perkins, 301
U.S. 655 (1937).
168. Treas. Reg. § 1.636-3(a)(1) (1973) (emphasis added).
169. See supra note 165.
170. Yates, 924 F.2d at 970-71 (quoting United States v. Morgan, 321 F.2d 781, 786
(5th Cir. 1963)).
171. As to the Campbell County acreage, McCaw was encouraged by the fact that Lear
was obligated under the lease to drill a well within six months to a depth sufficient to test
the Minnelusa formation, and had already drilled a producing well one-half mile from the
lease property which was producing 400 barrels of oil per day. As to the Golden Valley
County acreage, McCaw knew that Anadarko was drilling an offset well to a depth of
10,000 to 12,000 feet at a cost of approximately $1 million. Based on seismic data, he
believed that the Golden Valley lease acreage was on the same oil field as this well, a belief
reinforced by the significant retained interest Anadarko was willing to give to Yates on top
of the large cash payment. Finally, McCaw believed that the Converse County lease acre-
age was located over an area with potentially five different productive zones, based on his
study of maps, well completion cards and petroleum information bulletins. Yates v. Com-
missioner, 92 T.C. 1215, 1219-20 (1989).
172. See Morgan, 321 F.2d at 786. In Morgan, the taxpayer assigned an oil and gas lease
for $71,400 and an oil payment of $10 million payable out of 1/16th of production. The
lease was wildcat, the nearest production being two miles away. The district court granted
the taxpayer's motion for summary judgment based on a literal reading of the Anderson
test, see supra text accompanying note 152, and held the interest to be a production pay-
ment. The Fifth Circuit, noting that the tax laws deal with economic realities and not legal
abstractions, fashioned the test quoted supra text accompanying note 155, and remanded.
On remand, the district court concluded that it was "not reasonable [on the date of assign-
ment] that anyone could have reasonably expected the sum of $10,000,000 to be paid
before the expiration of the lease" and held the payment to be an advance against an
overriding royalty. Morgan v. United Sates, 245 F. Supp. 388, 390 (S.D. Miss. 1964).
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cannot be an objective expectation that the oil payment will be paid out
prior to the expiration of the lease unless there is also an objective ex-
pectation that the lease will have production from which payment can be
made. The question thus became whether Yates's retained interest pos-
sessed "an expected economic life." In the view of the Tenth Circuit,
the word "expected"
[n]either notes nor means a mere possibility of production.
Some reasonable degree of certainty, but less than absolute, is
thus required. The regulations requires this expectation to ex-
ist and be measured at the time of its creation which, in the
instant case, would mean at the time each lease was assigned as
this was the time when the overriding royalty was created.
7
The expert witnesses for the IRS had testified that the chances of
obtaining production from the leases were anywhere from 1 out of 25 to
1 out of 1 2 0 .174 Yates had pointed to the fact that there were productive
wells in the vicinity of the lease acreage Yates had assigned. However,
the Tenth Circuit found that Yates had been able to identify only one
productive well in the vicinity of each of the leases, whereas there were
many dry holes in the same vicinity. The Tenth Circuit noted that many
factors, other than the mere existence of a producing well in the vicinity,
are to be taken into account in determining the probability of obtaining
production from particular lease acreage.
Relevant circumstances would include numerous factors such
as available geological and seismic information; the cost of
lease acquisition; the costs of exploring, drilling and produc-
ing; the price of oil and the price of its treatment and transpor-
tation costs; the probable pay-out; the prices received by the
taxpayer; the proximity of production as well as many other fac-
tors. It would be a rare case if any one or two of these factors
were alone controlling.
75
Considering all the evidence, the Tenth Circuit agreed that the objective
prong of the Morgan test had not been satisfied, and the payments to
Yates were properly characterized as advances on an overriding royalty,
taxable as ordinary income.
The Tenth Circuit conceded that "a taxpayer who attempts to cre-
ate a 'production payment' from nondeveloped property bears a difficult
burden of persuasion." 176 The court noted, however, that "it is not an
impossible burden. The significant issue remains the same, i.e., whether
there exists a reasonable likelihood of production on the lease assigned
as of the date the production payment is being reserved." 17 7 The fact
that Yates subjectively believed that there was a slight possibility of pro-
duction was not enough to carry his burden of proof, since some reason-
173. Yates, 924 F.2d at 970.
174. Id at 971. Under the evidence most favorable to Yates, the prospects of produc-
tivity were I out of 5, a figure accepted by the Tax Court. Yates, 92 T.C. at 1229. Such
findings of fact are not to be set aside unless dearly erroneous. See supra note 87.
175. Yates, 924 F.2d at 971-72.




able degree ofcertainty is required to satisfy the objective prong of the
Morgan test. "Oil and gas developers are 'world class' optimists and the
fact they may regard a slight chance of production being obtained as a
'reasonable expectation' does not make it so."117
D. Summary
Given the relatively insubstantial difference in income tax brackets
applicable to ordinary income and capital gains under current law, clas-
sification of a retained interest as an overriding royalty or a production
payment would not seem to have much current urgency. However, if an
income tax bracket differential is reinstated in the future, Yates provides
essential guidance for taxpayers concerning the standards the Tenth
Circuit will apply-and the burden that will be imposed-in determining
whether a particular retained interest is a "production payment."
Although the Tenth Circuit did not adopt aper se rule that no production
payment can ever be created out of nonproducing property, 179 a tax-
payer's burden will be particularly high when the retained interest re-
lates to undeveloped or unproven property.
VIII. PROPERTY DOES NOT "PASS" TO SURVIVING SPOUSE FOR
PURPOSES OF THE MARITAL DEDUCTION WHEN SURVIVING
SPOUSE SURRENDERS HER SURVIVORSHIP RIGHTS IN
SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTE OVER ESTATE:
SCHROEDER V. UNITED STATES 
1 8 0
A. Background
The federal estate tax is imposed upon the value of every dece-
dent's taxable estate.18 1 The phrase "taxable estate" is defined as the
value of the decedent's "gross estate"'1 2 less certain deductions 18 3 al-
lowed under the Code. From an estate tax planning standpoint, the
marital deduction provided under I.R.C. § 2056 is the most important.
Under I.R.C. § 2056, "the value of the taxable estate shall.., be deter-
mined by deducting from the value of the gross estate an amount equal
to the value of any interest in property which passes or has passed from the
decedent to his surviving spouse."' 1 4 The marital deduction will be
available only if the property claimed to give rise to the marital deduc-
tion is considered to have "passed" from the decedent to the surviving
spouse.
As to property held jointly between a decedent and a surviving
178. Id
179. I&
180. 924 F.2d 1547 (10th Cir. 1991).
181. I.R.C. § 2001 (1988).
182. The value of the "gross estate" is determined by including the value of all the
decedent's property, real or personal, tangible or intangible, wherever situated, at the time
of his death. Id § 203 1(a). A series of important evaluation and inclusion rules are set
forth in id §§ 2032 to 2046.
183. Id §§ 2053 to 2056A.
184. Id. § 2056(a) (emphasis added).
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spouse, the Code specifically provides that an "interest in property shall
be considered as passing from the decedent to any person if... such
interest was, at the time of the decedent's death, held by such person
and the decedent ... in joint ownership with right of survivorship."
18 5
In Schroeder, a case of first impression in the federal estate tax area, the
Tenth Circuit was faced with the question whether property "passed"
from a decedent to his surviving spouse when the property had been
held in joint tenancy by the decedent and the surviving spouse, but the
surviving spouse had surrendered her survivorship rights to the prop-
erty in settlement of a dispute with the decedent's daughters from a pre-
vious marriage.
B. Facts
Thomas and Peggy Woodmansee were married for approximately
eighteen years. Thomas had two adult daughters from a previous mar-
riage, Martha Schroeder and Lou Ann Waters. Unbeknownst to Schroe-
der and Waters, Thomas created a substantial stock account with Merrill
Lynch in early July 1981, naming himself and Peggy as joint tenants with
a right of survivorship. Ten days later, Thomas executed a will provid-
ing that his property be placed in trust, the income from which was to be
used to provide for Peggy during the remainder of her life, with the
corpus of the trust to be divided equally between Schroeder and Waters
at Peggy's death. Both Schroeder and Waters executed an affidavit stat-
ing that they knew of the provisions of the will and of their father's in-
tent, and that both intended to honor their father's wishes. Two months
later, when the fair market value of the stock account was approximately
$229,843, Thomas died.
Pursuant to Peggy's survivorship rights in the stock account, the ac-
count passed directly to Peggy at Thomas's death and did not pass
through Thomas's will.1 8 6 Schroeder and Waters, however, felt that
185. Id § 2056(c)(5) (1988).
186. Although the property represented by the joint stock account did not pass to
Peggy pursuant to the terms of Thomas's will, under I.R.C. § 2040(a), the value of
Thomas's interest in the stock account would have been includable in determining his
gross estate. It should also be noted that the amount of a decedent's interest in jointly-
held property that is includable in the gross estate is not necessarily equal to his "interest"
in that property. The amount included is measured by the owners' relative monetary con-
tributions to the property. For example, the fact that A and B each own a one-half interest
in Blackacre as joint tenants does not mean that one-half the value of Blackacre will be
includable in A's gross estate upon her death. IfA had paid for Blackacre, the entire value
of Blackacre would be includable in her gross estate. Conversely, if B had provided all the
consideration in purchasing Blackacre, A would include nothing. See RICHARD B. STE-
PHENS ET AL., FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 4.12[4] (6th ed. 1991).
Presumably, however, only one-half of the stock account was includible in Thomas's
gross estate, under the "qualified joint interest" rules of I.R.C. § 2040(b). At the time of
Thomas's death, these rules provided that only one-half of a qualified joint interest is in-
cludible, and defined the term "qualified joint interest" to mean any interest in property
held by the decedent and the decedent's spouse as joint tenants or as tenants by the en-
tirety, but only if (a) the joint interest was created by the decedent, the decedent's spouse,
or both; (b) in the case of personal property, the creation of thejoint interest constituted a
gift in whole or in part; and (c) in the case of a joint tenancy, only the decedent and the
decedent's spouse are joint tenants. As a result of the enactment of the Economic Recov-
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Peggy had a "moral duty" to leave the principal of the stock account to
them and their children, consistent with the estate plan reflected in the
dispositive provisions of Thomas's will.
In February 1982, Peggy placed the stock account into a trust hav-
ing a neutral trustee to "maintain the peace and keep from being
sued."'18 7 One-fourth of the quarterly income from the trust was to be
distributed to Peggy, three-eighths to Schroeder, and three-eighths to
Waters. At Peggy's death, the principal in the trust account was to be
distributed in equal shares to Schroeder and Waters or their issue.
Thomas's interest in the joint stock account was included in the
gross estate on the estate tax return, and was also claimed as part of the
federal marital deduction under I.R.C. § 2056.188 The IRS disallowed
the portion of the marital deduction which was based upon the stock
account. The estate paid the deficiency and unsuccessfully claimed a re-
fund. Schroeder's husband, the executor of the estate, commenced a
refund suit in district court, which proved to be unsuccessful.1 8 9 On
appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed.
C. The Tenth Circuit's Opinion
The question before the Tenth Circuit1 90 on appeal was whether
Thomas's interest in the joint stock account "passed" to Peggy within
the scope of I.R.C. § 2056, so that the property qualified for the marital
deduction. The estate's position, of course, was that the property did
"pass" to Peggy, since the stock account was held in joint ownership
with right of survivorship at Thomas's death. 19 1 If the position of the
estate were accepted, the principal of the joint stock account would have
passed to Thomas's daughters without the imposition of an estate tax at
the parental level.
This result is inconsistent with the legislative purpose of the marital
deduction, which is to allow property to pass without the imposition of
an estate tax within the marital unit when one spouse dies. Absent the
existence of the marital deduction, an estate tax would be imposed on
ery Tax Act of 1981, a qualified joint interest is now defined as any interest in property
held by the decedent and the decedent's spouse as (a) tenants by the entirety, or (b) joint
tenants with right of survivorship, but only if the decedent and the spouse of the decedent
are the onlyjoint tenants. I.R.C. § 2040(b)(2) (1988). The qualified joint interest rules are
designed to sidestep the obvious difficulties inherent in determining the relative monetary
contributions that each spouse makes to marital property.
187. Schroeder v. United States, 696 F. Supp. 1426, 1428 (W.D. Okla. 1988).
188. Thomas died September 17, 1981. At that time, I.R.C. § 2056(c)(1)(A) limited
the marital deduction to the greater of $250,000, or 50% of the value of the gross estate
(calculated with certain adjustments). The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 repealed
I.R.C. § 2056(c), and for estates of decedents dying after December 31, 1981, the marital
deduction is unlimited as to property passing to the surviving spouse in a manner other-
wise qualifying for the deduction.
189. Schroeder, 696 F.Supp. 1426.
190. The three-judge panel was comprised of ChiefJudge McKay, Judge Seymour, and
Judge John L. Kane, United States District Court for the District of Colorado, sitting by
designation.
191. See supra text accompanying note 185.
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the gross estate of the first spouse to die, and imposed again when their
surviving spouse dies, leaving the property to the children of the marital
unit. The children would receive the property only after an estate tax
had been imposed twice at the parental level.
The pre-1982 marital deduction provided a partial solution to this
problem and paid some deference to the notion that transfers between
spouses, being transfers within a single marital unit, should not be
taxed, or at least should not be fully taxed. As part of the "family orien-
tation" of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, the marital deduc-
tion became unlimited, giving full effect to the notion that transfers
between spouses in the marital unit should not be taxed.' 92 The legisla-
tive history accompanying the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 pro-
vides that:
Because the maximum estate tax marital deduction gener-
ally is limited, under present law, to one-half of a decedents'
adjusted gross estate, the estate of a decedent who bequeaths
his entire estate to his surviving spouse may be subject to estate
taxes even though the property remains within the marital unit.
When the surviving spouse later transfers the property (often
to their children), the entire amount is subject to transfer taxes.
The cumulative effect is to subject their property to tax one and
one-half times, i.e., one-half upon the death of the first spouse,
and again fully upon the death of the second spouse. This ef-
fect typically occurs in the case of jointly held property. Be-
cause this additional tax falls most heavily on widows, it is often
referred to as the "widow's tax."
Although the committee recognizes that this additional tax
can be minimized through proper estate planning, it believes
that an individual should be free to pass his entire estate to a
surviving spouse without the imposition of any additional tax
193
The legislative history of the marital deduction clearly evinces an
understanding that the estate tax will be imposed upon the ultimate
transfer of the property to the next generation, although no estate tax is
to be imposed upon transfers between members of the marital unit. If
Thomas's estate plan had been structured so that his interest in the joint
stock account passed instead to the testamentary trust' 94 or directly to
Thomas's daughters, no marital deduction would be allowable. The es-
tate was in effect arguing that it could do indirectly what could not be
done directly, that is, pass property from the marital unit to the next
generation without the imposition of an estate tax.195
192. "[A] husband and wife should be treated as one economic unit for purposes of
estate and gift taxes, as they generally are for income tax purposes. Accordingly, no tax
should be imposed on transfers between a husband and wife." S. REP. No. 97-144, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. 126 (1981), reprinted in 1981 U.S.C.C.A.N 105, 228.
193. H.R. REP. No. 97-201, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 158-64 (1981).
194. Subject to the possibility of structuring the arrangement as a "qualified termina-
ble interest property" trust, or "QTIP trust." I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7) (1988).
195. Peggy did not report the transfer of the stock account into the new trust on a gift
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Before addressing whether the property "passed" to Peggy, the
Tenth Circuit first considered the IRS's primary contention that the
matter was controlled by the "will contest regulation," which provides
that:
(1) If, as a result of a controversy involving the decedent's
will, or involving any bequest or devise thereunder, his surviv-
ing spouse assigns or surrenders a property interest in settle-
ment of the controversy, the interest so assigned or
surrendered is not considered as having "passed from the de-
cedent to his surviving spouse."
(2) If, as a result of the controversy involving the dece-
dent's will, or involving any bequest or devise thereunder, a
property interest is assigned or surrendered to the surviving
spouse, the interest so acquired will be regarded as having
"passed from the decedent to his surviving spouse" only if the
assignment or surrender was a bona fide recognition of en-
forceable rights of the surviving spouse in the decedent's es-
tate. Such a bona fide recognition will be presumed where the
assignment or surrender was pursuant to a decision of a local
court upon the merits in an adversary proceeding following a
genuine and active contest. However, such a decree will be ac-
cepted only to the extent that the court passed upon the facts
upon which deductibility of the property interest depends. If
the assignment or surrender was pursuant to a decree rendered
by consent, or pursuant to an agreement not to contest the will
or not to probate the will, it will not necessarily be accepted as
a bona fide evaluation of the rights of the spouse. 196
The Tenth Circuit pointed out that the will contest regulation is
consistent with the legislative history of I.R.C. § 2056, which provides:
If the surviving spouse takes under the decedent's will, the
interest passing to her is determined from the will. In this con-
nection proper regard should be given to interpretations of the
will rendered by a court in a bona fide adversary proceeding.
If, as a result of a controversy involving a bequest or devise to
the surviving spouse, such spouse assigns or surrenders an in-
terest in property pursuant to a compromise agreement in set-
tlement of such controversy the amount so assigned or
surrendered is not deductible as an interest passing to such
spouse.1
9 7
The Tenth Circuit found that the will contest regulation, when read
together with the legislative history, reflected at least two aspects that
seemed to be absent under the facts in Schroeder. First, the regulations
and the legislative history can be fairly read to implicitly require that the
''will contest" or "controversy" arise in some sort of formal adversarial
tax return, nor did she report the transfer as a sale of the account on her income tax
return.
196. Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(e)-2(d) (1958).
197. S. REP. No. 1013, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1948), reprinted in 1948 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1163, 1226.
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proceeding, involving litigation and a judicial determination of the par-
ties' rights, or at least a settlement of such litigation. Second, the will
controversy must be one "involving the decedent's will, or involving any
bequest or devise thereunder."
The IRS relied heavily upon cases which had expansively applied
the will contest regulation to disallow claimed marital deductions. In
Citizens & Southern National Bank v. United States,19 8 the decedent had died
intestate owning property in Florida and in Georgia. After the dece-
dent's death, his wife and his son from a previous marriage entered into
an agreement under which she received $40,000 from the son in ex-
change for her statutory interest in the Georgia and Florida properties.
Relying upon the will contest regulation, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the
IRS's disallowance of the marital deduction based on the value of the
Florida and Georgia properties, and limited the deduction to the
$40,000 actually received by the surviving spouse.
The Fifth Circuit had relied upon the Second Circuit's broad inter-
pretation of the will contest regulation in United States Trust Co. v. Commis-
sioner.1 99 In that case, the decedent intended to give his wife a life estate
with a power of appointment over a portion of his New York estate and
to have his wife inherit his villa in France. The latter disposition was
blocked by a French requirement that his daughters execute certain doc-
uments, which they refused to do. After negotiations, the daughters
agreed to execute the appropriate documents in exchange for the wife's
agreement to relinquish her power of appointment over the decedent's
New York property. The Second Circuit concluded that the wife could
not claim her marital deduction for the value of the New York property,
holding that the marital deduction was to be taken only for the property
which the wife actually received after the terms of the settlement agree-
ment had been fulfilled, i.e., the French property, which did not qualify
for the marital deduction. The Second Circuit stated that "[w]hen the
resolution of a controversy between the beneficiaries regarding the de-
cedent's property culminates in an agreement by which the surviving
spouse relinquishes property which qualifies for the marital deduction in
return for property which does not so qualify, [the will contest regula-
tion] is applicable."'
20 0
The Tenth Circuit strongly indicated that it would not follow either
United States Trust Co. or Citizens & Southern if faced with similar facts. The
court first pointed out that both the Second and Fifth Circuits had inter-
preted the phrase "contest" as used in the will contest regulation to in-
clude mere arms-length negotiations among beneficiaries. In the Tenth
Circuit's view, this is not enough to trigger application of the will contest
regulation. 20 1 The court likewise criticized the approach of Citizens &
198. 451 F.2d 221 (5th Cir. 1971).
199. 321 F.2d 908 (2d Cir. 1963).
200. Id. at 910-11.
201. The court described United States Trust Co. and Citizens & Southern as having ex-
panded the reach of the will contest regulation "well beyond its plain language.... to
included arms-length negotiations conducted between parties who have potentially adverse
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Southern in interpreting "the decedent's will, or involving any bequest or
devise thereunder" to "include transfers of property at death under in-
testacy statutes or spousal election." 2 02 The court declined to adopt
such as expansive interpretation when the property did not pass under
Thomas's will, or involve a bequest or devise under the will, but was
instead transferred pursuant to Peggy's right of survivorship.
Peggy's rights in the present case to ... the joint account do
not arise under Thomas' will. It is undisputed that Peggy sur-
rendered this property in settlement not of a will contest, but of
a more general controversy over the rightful passing of
Thomas' property considered as a whole. By its plain terms,
therefore, the will contest regulation is not dispositive here.
2 0 3
The Tenth Circuit then turned to the key question under I.R.C.
§ 2056: whether the stock account "passed" from the decedent to
Peggy. The court recognized that transfers of property by survivorship
rights concerning joint interests "passed" within the meaning of the
Code's marital deduction provision. Nevertheless, the court stated that
the stock account property did not "pass", to Peggy. Borrowing from
the reasoning of United States Trust Co. and Citizens & Southern, the court
construed the statutory "passing" requirement to mean "property to
which the surviving spouse retains her rights after resolution of all dis-
putes concerning the decedent's property, '20 4 regardless of the me-
dium by which the property passes.
[W]e find the reasons those courts articulated to broaden the
reach of the regulation to be persuasive in our own analysis of
what Congress intended by the "passing" requirement in the
marital deduction statute. To the extent a surviving spouse
surrenders her share of the decedent's property to other bene-
ficiaries not entitled to the marital deduction to avoid litigation
concerning her rights, it defies common sense to conclude that
this property "passed" to the surviving spouse.20 5
As support for its conclusion, the Tenth Circuit reiterated the con-
gressional purpose behind the marital deduction:
The marital deduction was designed to eliminate the "double-
taxation" that would result when the same property became
subject to tax upon the death of each spouse. Once property
passes outside of the interspousal unit, however, this exception
no longer applies. Under Schroeder's proposed interpretation,
property may exit the spousal unit without ever creating a taxa-
ble event. Congress clearly did not intend to replace double-
taxation with tax avoidance. 20 6
positions. Under this view, no litigation is required, much less court adjudication of vari-
ous parties' rights to the property of the deceased." Schroeder v. United States, 924 F.2d
1547, 1553 (10th Cir. 1991) (emphasis added).
202. Id.
203. Id
204. Id at 1553-54 (quoting Citizens & Southern Nat'! Bank v. United States, 451 F.2d
221, 227 (5th Cir. 1971) (emphasis added)).
205. Id. at 1554.
206. Id at 1555.
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Peggy did not retain any rights in the stock account after resolution
of the dispute, and the legislative purpose of the marital deduction
would be frustrated if the estate could claim a marital deduction with
respect to Thomas's interest in the account. The Tenth Circuit thus
held that no marital deduction was allowable for the value of Thomas's
interest in the account at his death.
D. Summary
As noted, Schroeder is a case of first impression not only in the Tenth
Circuit, but in the general area of federal estate taxation. The Tenth
Circuit's conclusion that the stock account did not "pass" to Peggy
within the meaning of I.R.C. § 2056, despite the nonapplicability of the
will contest regulation, rests squarely on firm policy grounds. If a con-
trary view were taken, beneficiaries could stage friendly "controversies"
with the goal of claiming a martial deduction for property that comes to
rest outside the marital unit in the next generation.
The Tenth Circuit's unwillingness to expansively apply the will con-
test regulation may also indicate a more general philosophy that the
Treasury Regulations should be construed narrowly, and invoked only
when the language of the Regulations is by its terms expressly relevant.
When interpreting and applying the broader provisions of the Code it-
self, however, the Tenth Circuit seems perfectly willing to invoke legiti-
mate policy concerns to reach proper results.
Schroeder did not resolve the proper treatment of property that a sur-
viving spouse receives from others in return for her relinquishment of
rights in the property otherwise qualifying for the deduction. The will
contest regulation again would appear to be inapplicable, because there
would be no true "will controversy," and because the controversy would
not involve the decedent's will or bequests or devises thereunder.
Under the analysis of United States Trust Co. and Citizens & Southern, how-
ever, which focuses on the state of affairs as they exist after all disputes
have been resolved, the property received by the surviving spouse in
exchange for relinquishing rights in jointly-held property should qualify
for the marital deduction, just as the $40,000 payment qualified in Citi-
zens & Southern.
IX. JUDGMENT CREDITOR'S CHOATE LIEN IN AFTER-ACQUIRED
PROPERTY PRIMES LATER-PERFECTED FEDERAL TAX LIEN:
McDERMOTT v. ZIoNS FIRST NATIONAL BANK 
2 0 7
A. Background
The Code grants a lien in favor of the United States upon all prop-
erty and rights to property, whether real or personal, belonging to any
person liable to pay any tax who neglects or refuses to pay the same
207. 945 F.2d 1475 (10th Cir. 1991).
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after demand.20 8 The general rule under the Code is that the general
federal tax lien arises at the time the assessment is made209 and contin-
ues until the liability for the amount so assessed is satisfied or becomes
unenforceable by reason of lapse of time.
2 10
The priority afforded competing federal tax liens and state-created
liens is a matter of federal law. 211 Secured creditors will generally have
priority over the federal tax lien if their state-created liens were fully
perfected and choate before the federal tax lien arose at the time of as-
sessment.212 Judgment lien creditors, however, are afforded special
treatment under the Code. The Code provides that the general federal
tax lien is not valid against any judgment lien creditor until notice
thereof has been filed by the IRS. 213 McDermott was an interpleader ac-
tion centering on the competing claims of a judgment lien creditor and
the IRS in real property located in Salt Lake County, Utah.
B. Facts
Zions First National Bank ("Zions") had obtained ajudgment in the
amount of $67,977.67 against the McDermotts onJune 22, 1987. Zions
properly docketed the judgment in Salt Lake County on July 6, 1987.
Under Utah law, Zions's lien attached to all of the McDermotts' real
property located in the county.2 14 The IRS obtained its lien by filing a
Notice of Federal Tax Lien on September 9, 1987. As a result of this
filing, the IRS's lien attached to all the McDermotts's owned and after-
acquired real and personal property. 215
On September 23, 1987, the McDermotts acquired title to real
208. I.R.C. § 6321 (1988). The lien secures the amount of the deficiency, plus any
interest, additional amount, addition to tax, assessable penalty and costs.
209. Assessments are little more than bookkeeping notations entered by the IRS on the
taxpayer's account indicating that the amount has been administratively determined to be
due and payable.
210. I.R.C. § 6322 (1988).
211. United States v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the U.S., 384 U.S. 323, 328
(1966); Allan v. Diamond T Motor Car Co., 291 F.2d 115, 116 (10th Cir. 1961). The gen-
eral federal tax lien" 'creates no property rights but merely attaches consequences, feder-
ally defined, to rights created under state law.'" Avco Delta Corp. of Can. Ltd. v. United
States, 459 F.2d 436, 440 (7th Cir. 1972) (quoting United States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51, 55
(1958)).
212. United States v. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. 81 (1954).
213. I.R.C. § 6323(a) (1988). In Colorado, such notice is deemed to have been pro-
vided by the IRS (a) with respect to real property, upon the filing of a Notice of Tax Lien
with the Office of the Clerk and Recorder for the county in which the real property is
located; and (b) as to personal property, upon the filing of a Notice of Tax Lien with the
Colorado Secretary of State. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 38-25-102 (Supp. 1990).
214. Utah law provides:
From the time the judgment of the District Court or Circuit Court is docketed
and filed in the Office of the Clerk of the District Court of the County it becomes
a lien upon all the real property of the judgment debtor, not exempt from execu-
tion, in the county in which the judgment is entered, owned by him at the time or
by him thereafter acquired during the existence of said lien.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-22-1 (1992) (emphasis added).
215. Even though not specifically stated in I.R.C. § 6321, the general federal tax lien
applies to after-acquired property. Glass City Bank v. United States, 326 U.S. 265 (1945).
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property in Salt Lake County. 2 16 The McDermotts already had a pur-
chaser for this property. However, in order to obtain title insurance for
the property to complete the sale, the McDermotts were required to ob-
tain releases from Zions and the IRS. The parties entered into an es-
crow agreement under which Zions and the IRS released their claims to
the Salt Lake County property, but reserved their rights to the cash pro-
ceeds of the sale. The escrow agreement provided that the priority of
the competing claims of Zions and the IRS would remain identical to the
priorities they held in the Salt Lake County property. 2 17 The escrow
agreement also called for the McDermotts to institute an interpleader
action so that a court could determine who was entitled to priority in the
proceeds of the sale.
In the district court,2 18 the IRS argued that its lien should have pri-
ority over the lien held by Zions because the latter was not "choate"
when the IRS filed its Notice of Tax Lien since the McDermotts did not
yet own the property. The district court sided with Zions in an unre-
ported decision, and the IRS appealed.
C. The Tenth Circuit's Opinion
The issue before the Tenth Circuit 2 19 was whether Zions's non-con-
tingent, or choate, lien on all of the McDermott's real property, per-
fected prior to the federal tax lien, took priority over the federal lien
when the competing lienors were each claiming an interest in after-ac-
quired property. As noted above, judgment lien creditors are among
the creditors who have priority over federal tax liens when their liens are
fully perfected and "choate" prior to the filing of the federal govern-
ment's Notice of Tax Lien. "The doctrine of choateness is intended to
protect the standing of federal liens. 'Otherwise, a State could affect the
standing of federal liens, contrary to the established doctrine, simply by
causing an inchoate lien to attach at some arbitrary time. ... ,220
216. The McDermotts had originally sold this property to two individuals in 1981, tak-
ing back a note and a deed of trust which secured the note with the purchasers' interest in
the property, such interest being conveyed to the public trustee. The purchasers defaulted
and, after some interim struggles and maneuvers, the McDermotts succeeded in getting
the trustee to notice a sale of the property, at which the McDermotts repurchased the
property by submitting a credit bid and assuming an underlying mortgage. McDermott v.
Zions First Nat'l Bank, 945 F.2d 1475, 1477-78 (10th Cir. 1991).
217. The escrow agreement provided, in relevant part:
The respective priorities of the parties to the cash proceeds shall be identical to
the priorities of the respective liens of the parties as they existed against the real
property as of September 23, 1987, after BruceJ. McDermott successfully bid and
purchased the property at the Trustee's Sale, notwithstanding the change in form
of the collateral.
Id. at 1477.
218. The interpleader action was originally brought by the McDermotts in state court,
but the United States removed the case to federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1)
(1988).
219. The three-judge panel consisted of Judge Tacha, Judge Seth and Judge Howard
C. Bratton, United States District Court for the District of New Mexico, sitting by
designation.
220. McAllen State Bank v. Sacenz, 561 F.Supp. 636, 639 (S.D. Tex. 1982) (quoting
United States v. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. 81, 86 (1954)).
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Whether a lien is choate is a federal question.22 1 For a prior lien on all
of a person's real or personal property to take priority over a federal tax
lien, the lien must be "perfected in the sense that there is nothing more
to be done to have a choate lien-when the identity of the lienor, the
property subject to the lien, and the amount of the lien are
established."
22 2
The Treasury Regulations acknowledge the judicially-created cho-
ateness doctrine in defining the term "judgment lien creditor" for pur-
poses of the Code.2 23 The position of the IRS on appeal in McDermott
was that the "property subject to the lien" had not been established as
required by this definition, and that the lien was therefore not choate.
Because the choateness doctrine requires that the property subject to
the lien be established, the IRS argued, a judgment lien creditor can
only acquire a perfected or choate lien with respect to property owned
by the debtor at the time the judgment creditor obtains his lien. There-
fore, after-acquired property of the debtor would be subject to a supe-
rior federal tax lien if that lien was perfected by filing after the judgment
lien creditor obtained his lien, but before the debtor obtained owner-
ship of the property to which the competing liens attach. Since Zions's
judgment lien did not become choate until September 23, 1987, when
the McDermotts acquired title to the real property in question, the IRS's
lien, as perfected by its Notice of Federal Tax Lien filed on September 9,
1987, would take priority. The Tenth Circuit rejected the IRS's position,
holding that a judgment lien creditor having a choate lien on all of a
person's real property will take priority over a later-perfected federal tax
lien, even when the IRS and the judgment creditor are claiming after-
acquired property.
In support of its decision, the Tenth Circuit relied primarily on
United States v. Vermont. 224 In Vermont, the State of Vermont and the
United States held almost identical general tax liens upon all the tax-
payer's real and personal property. Vermont's lien arose approximately
221. United States v. Security Trust & Say. Bank, 340 U.S. 47, 49-50 (1950).
222. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. at 84.
223. The definition states that:
The term "judgment lien creditor" means a person who has obtained a valid
judgment, in a court of record and of competent jurisdiction, for the recovery of
specifically designated property or for a certain sum of money. In the case of a
judgment for the recovery of a certain sum of money, ajudgment lien creditor is a
person who has perfected a lien under the judgment on the property involved. A
judgment lien is not perfected until the identity of the lienor, the property subjet to the lien, and
the amount of the lien are established. Accordingly, ajudgment lien does not include
an attachment or garnishment lien until the lien has ripened into judgment, even
though under local law the lien of the judgment relates back to an earlier date. If
recording or docketing is necessary under local law before a judgment becomes
effective against third parties acquiring liens on real property, a judgment lien
under such local law is not perfected with respect to real property until the time
of such recordation or docketing. If under local law levy or seizure is necessary
before a judgment lien becomes effective against third parties acquiring liens on
personal property, then a judgment lien under such local law is not perfected
until levy or seizure of the personal property involved....
Treas. Reg. § 301.6323(h)-l(g) (1976) (emphasis added).
224. 377 U.S. 351 (1964).
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three and one-half months prior to the federal tax lien. As in McDermott,
the United States argued that a state-created lien had to attach to spe-
cific property in order for it to take priority. The Supreme Court held
that both liens were equally perfected as to all the taxpayer's property
and were choate at the time the liens arose.2 25 Therefore, when both
governments attempted to satisfy their liens with the same after-ac-
quired property, Vermont's lien took priority since it arose first.
2 26
The Tenth Circuit concluded that Zions's lien was no less choate
than was Vermont's in United States v. Vermont. Zions's lien "was not con-
tingent, it was docketed, specific in amount, and fully enforceable
against any real property owned by the McDermotts in Salt Lake County
during the pendency of the lien."' 2 27 The Tenth Circuit thus concluded
that "judgment lien creditors who perfect their liens before the filing a
federal tax lien have priority," 2 28 even where the property against which
the competing liens are asserted is after-acquired property.
D. Summary
McDermott should allay any fears of judgment lien creditors about
the priority of their liens over competing federal tax liens with respect to
after-acquired property. If the judgment lien creditor's lien becomes
choate prior to the filing of notice of the federal tax lien under the cho-
ateness doctrine, as reflected in the Treasury Regulations and as inter-
preted by the courts, the federal lien will not prime the judgment lien.
X. No DEDUCTION FOR INTEREST ATRIBUTABLE TO NONRECOURSE




The Code generally allows taxpayers to deduct "all interest paid or
accrued within the taxable year on indebtedness. '2 0 However, for such
225. Id. at 358-59.
226. Id at 354, 359.
227. McDermott v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, 945 F.2d 1475, 1481 (10th Cir. 1991).
228. Id
229. In an unpublished Order and Judgment ("the Order"), 937 F.2d 616 (10th Cir.
1991), the Tenth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's decision in Ames v. Commissioner, 58
T.C.M. (CCH) 1470 (1990). The Order is reprinted at 91-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)
50,363. The Order has no precedential value and may not be cited or used by any court
within the Tenth Circuit, except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of law of the
case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10TH CIR. R. 36.3.
230. I.R.C. § 163 (1988). The taxable year at issue in Ames was 1981. Subsequently,
I.R.C. § 163 was substantially amended, particularly by the Tax Reform Act of 1986. To-
day, the deductibility of interest generally turns on the classification of that interest as
either "investment interest" (generally deductible only to the extent of net investment
income, see id. § 163(d)); "qualified residence interest" (consisting of either acquisition
indebtedness or home equity indebtedness with respect to any qualified residence of the
taxpayer, subject to various definitional and other limitations, see id. § 163(h)(3)); interest
paid or accrued on indebtedness allocable to a trade or business (generally, fully deducti-
ble); or "personal interest" (generally all types of consumer interest other than the forego-
ing, fully nondeductible for 1991 and later tax years, see id. § 163(h)).
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interest to be deductible, there must be a valid and legitimate "indebt-
edness" in respect to which the interest is payable.231 Special consider-
ations arise when the debt is nonrecourse and the secured lender may
only look to the encumbered property in the event of default. Courts
will generally not view nonrecourse debt as legitimate if the amount of
the obligation bears no reasonable relationship to the value of the prop-
erty securing the payment of the debt. Where the amount of the indebt-
edness far exceeds the fair market value of the property securing the
debt, the borrower/taxpayer will be considered as having no economic
incentive to meet the debt service payments because the taxpayer will
never obtain any equity in the property. All other things being equal, the
taxpayer will be viewed as having no other incentive but to simply aban-
don the property to the secured lender. Since the indebtedness is un-
likely to be repaid in these circumstances, it will not ordinarily be
recognized for tax purposes.
232
B. Facts
Henry Ames was one of several taxpayers who participated in a tax
shelter arrangement involving fifty-two vacation homes in the Park City,
Utah, area. In 1980, Ames233 purchased a timeshare unit in one of these
vacation homes, which gave him the right to occupy the home for one
day each year. The purchase price wals $2775, of which Ames paid $650
down, leaving an unpaid principal of $2125. The sales contract with the
seller of the vacation homes23 4 called for interest to be paid on the
$2125 at the rate of 188%o ($3995) per year for the first fourteen years,
and 47% ($998.75) per year for the remaining sixteen years. Ames
agreed to pay $465 per year for the first ten years to be applied to inter-
est. No further principal or interest payments were required until thirty
years from the purchase date, when a balloon payment of principal and
accrued but unpaid interest equal to $69,475 would be due and payable.
At that time, because the debt was nonrecourse, Ames was effectively
faced with the choice of either forfeiting his interest in the timeshare
unit to his lender, or making the balloon payment of $69,475 and be-
coming the owner of the timeshare unit.
231. See, e.g., Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 81 (1960); Durkin v. Commissioner,
872 F.2d 1271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 824 (1989); Norton v. Commissioner, 474
F.2d 608 (9th Cir. 1973); Narver v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. 53, aff'd without published opin-
ion, 670 F.2d 855, (9th Cir. 1982).
232. See, e.g., Lebowitz v. Commissioner, 917 F.2d 1314 (2d Cir. 1990); Odend'hal v.
Commissioner, 748 F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1143 (1985); Estate of
Franklin v. Commissioner, 544 F.2d 1045 (9th Cir. 1976). In addition, highly contingent
or speculative obligations, recourse or nonrecourse, are not recognized for federal income
tax purposes. Fox v. Commissioner, 731 F.2d 230 (4th Cir. 1984); Brountas v. Commis-
sioner, 73 T.C. 491 (1979).
233. In actuality, the husband-and-wife taxpayers formed a partnership, "Ames and
Ames," to avoid Utah usury law. The partnership then elected to utilize the accrual
method of accounting.
234. Kilburn Vacation Home Shares, Inc. owned the vacation homes. Kilburn had con-
verted the homes to time shares, dividing each home into 350 days and reserving the
remaining 15 days for maintenance and cleaning. The timeshare units were then marketed
though a dealer, Affiliated Development Corp., and by secondary dealers.
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In 1980 and 1981, the taxpayers claimed a deduction for interest in
the amount of $3995.235 The Tax Court upheld the Commissioner's
disallowance of the interest deductions, finding that the investment in
the timeshare units did not constitute genuine indebtedness. 23 6 The
taxpayers appealed.
23 7
C. The Tenth Circuit's Order
At the Tax Court level, the taxpayers had theorized that the
timeshare unit would appreciate from 12.7% to 23% per year during the
life of the purchase contract, due to inflation and other factors. It was
therefore contended that the purchase was a sound business investment,
and that the property would have a fair market value at all times equal to
the amount of the payoff figure for the loan. The Tax Court, while in no
way accepting these projections, had concluded that the opposite was
true. Due to the fact that the interest rate was front-loaded at 188% for
the first fourteen years, and then accrued at the rate of 47% per year for
the final sixteen years, the payoff figure for the indebtedness would al-
ways be much higher than the fair market value.
23 8
The Tenth Circuit 23 9 concluded that the "record well supports this
conclusion" 2 40 and accepted the findings of the Tax Court.24 1 It
235. This represented an approximate write-off ratio of 8.6:1 as compared with the
annual payment of $465.
236. Ames v. Commissioner, 58 T.C.M. (CCH) 1470 (1990).
237. There were many other participants in the Park City arrangement, whose appeals
lie variously in the Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeal. The
Fifth and Ninth Circuits have both recently affirmed the Tax Court's decision in Ames with
respect to some of these taxpayers. See Lukens v. Commissioner, 945 F.2d 92 (5th Cir.
1991); and Hildebrand v. Commissioner, 92-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,350.
238. The Tax Court had also examined whether the $2775 purchase price for the
timeshare unit bore any relationship to its actual fair market value, or alternatively,
whether the purchase price was inflated. After an extensive review of the testimony prof-
fered by various expert witnesses from both parties, the Tax Court found that the
timeshare unit had a fair market value of $791.80 on the date it was purchased, an amount
that was far less than the purchase price of $2775. Thus, even if the Ames' expert witness
was accurate in his assessment of the percentage increases in fair market value that could
be expected over the life of a contract, those percentage increases, when applied to the
lower figure of $791.80, would never cause the fair market value of the property to exceed
the accrued amount of the debt.
This disparity between the fair market value and the payoff amount would con-
tinue throughout the life of the loan. Petitioners would never have any equity in
the property; in fact, they would always have a negative equity because the payoff
amount would always exceed the fair market value of the property.
Ames, 58 T.C.M. at 1490.
239. The three-judge panel was composed ofJudge Anderson,Judge Tacha and Judge
Brorby.
240. Ames v. Commissioner, 91-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,363 at 89,289.
241. The determination of the Tax Court concerning the fair market value of property
such as the timeshare unit is a finding of fact reviewable under the clearly erroneous stan-
dard. Morris v. Commissioner, 761 F.2d 1195 (6th Cir. 1985). The Tax Court is free
either to accept or to reject expert testimony if the testimony does not withstand careful
analysis, and may disregard proffered expert opinion altogether and reach a determination
of value based upon its own evaluation of the evidence in the record. Helvering v. Na-
tional Grocery Co., 304 U.S. 282 (1938); Silverman v. Commissioner, 538 F.2d 927 (2d
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 938 (1977); In re Williams' Estate, 256 F.2d 217 (9th Cir.
1958); Parker v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 547 (1986). The Tenth Circuit rejected the tax-
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"would be highly unlikely that the obligation would ever be paid" be-
cause it would always "cost far more to pay the debt than the property
would be worth."'24 2 The court concluded that the only "economic in-
centive to retain this timeshare unit was the hoped-for ability to deduct
from federal taxes far more interest than would ever be paid."
'2 43
In light of these determinations, the Tenth Circuit had little trouble
upholding the Tax Court's determination that the indebtedness had no
economic substance. The Commissioner's disallowance of the claimed
interest deductions was therefore upheld.
D. Summary
Ames should come as no surprise. The Tax Court and the Tenth
Circuit followed accepted precedent in holding that interest payable in
connection with nonrecourse obligations may not be deducted under
the Code in circumstances where the amount of the nonrecourse indebt-
edness far exceeds the fair market value of the property. The aggressive
tax shelter scheme fashioned in Ames was particularly vulnerable to this
analysis. In such cases, the debt will be viewed as having no substance,
and the interest deductions attributable to the debt will be swept
away.2 4
4
payers' contention on appeal that the Tax Court had erroneously excluded the conclusion
of its expert witness, had not given proper consideration to the admission of the Commis-
sioner's expert with respect to the projected rate of inflation over the next thirty years, and
had not paid sufficient deference to the opinions of experts about the fair market value of
the timeshare unit on the date of purchase. Ames, 91-2 U.S. Tax. Cas. 1 50,363 at 89,289.
242. Ames, 91-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 50,363 at 89,289.
243. Id
244. The Tenth Circuit's Order reserved comment on the merits of Pleasant Summit
Land Corp. v. Commissioner, 863 F.2d 263 (3rd Cir. 1988), cert. denied sub nom. Commis-
sioner v. Prussin, 493 U.S. 901 (1989), and its application to the Ames' timeshare unit. In
Pleasant Summit, the Third Circuit held that a proportionate interest deduction should be
allowed to the extent of the fair market value of the collateral, at least in circumstances
where the incentive of the taxpayer and the lender would be to compromise the nonre-
course debt to amount of the pledged property's fair market value. The Tenth Circuit
declined to consider the "partial deduction" theory since Ames had raised the issue for the
first time on appeal. For a discussion of (and apparent disapproval of Pleasant Summit, see
Lukens v. Commissioner, 945 F.2d 92, 97-99 (5th Cir. 1991).
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